LAW IN HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS

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LAW IN HISTORY

AND

OTHER ESSAYS

BY

EDWARD P. CHEYNEY

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PREFACE

The author has seldom been tempted, in such writing and speaking as he has done, to wander from the familiar fields of history; they are quite broad enough. But he confesses to an ever-growing inclination to make those fields more productive,—to make the present explain the past and to bring the past to bear on the present; although this is, strictly speaking, no part of a scientific historian's task. The titles of these six addresses, scattered as they have been over a period of twenty years, may betray this propensity. Among such inferences from the study of history perhaps the one to which he has been most frequently led, notwithstanding the fact that it is just now somewhat in disrepute in the world, is a profound belief in democracy. That democracy has proved itself on the whole wiser than autocracy or oligarchy, its only serious competitors,—that only by self-government can men obtain the best that is possible from government,—that the whole body of the people can and will eventually govern themselves, has been borne in upon him more and more.

If some things are asserted in these addresses that cannot be proved, it must be remembered that they are intended to be expressions of opinion about history, not additions to the knowledge of history. If some statements are inconsistent with others it can only

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be said that consistency is the poorest of virtues. Especially between things written before and those written since 1914 there may well be a great gulf fixed. Many a scholar who before the Great War was satisfied to cultivate his science for its own sake and to teach it solely for the love of learning, since that catastrophe has felt that he must make his knowledge, such as it is, and his opportunities, whatever they may be, directly serviceable. He wishes to contribute, if he can, to the protection of civilization from the dangers that beset it, and help in the advancement of men to the possibilities that lie before them. If there are inconsistencies in these addresses due to this change of attitude, so much the better.

Apology must be made for repetitions, if such are observed. The stock of ideas and examples at the command of any man is necessarily limited. The busy life of the teacher is not especially conducive to originality. He learns much from books and associates and he gets inspiration from his students, and occasionally he has time to think, but academic soil is not so fertile in new ideas as more detached scholarship on one side and practical life on the other.

EDWARD P. CHEYNEY.

University of Pennsylvania,
March, 1927.

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LAW IN HISTORY

AND

OTHER ESSAYS

I

LAW IN HISTORY

N the morning of the tenth of August, 1588, the last and most eventful day of the running fight of the English fleet with the Spanish Armada, the wind blew steadily from the southwest. As the day wore on it rose to the force of a gale; the Spanish ships as they emerged from the harbor of Calais, unmanageable and harried by the English, drove northward before the wind, past the mouth of the Scheldt, for which they were bound, and through the North Sea, till after a long and stormy course around Scotland and Ireland, broken and scattered, they regained the Spanish and Portuguese harbors. If the wind on that critical day had blown from some other quarter the Invincible Armada might have justified its name and effected the invasion of England. What an overwhelming influence on the course of events to be exercised by a mere vagary of the weather!

In the year 1527, Henry VIII was approaching the "dangerous age" of forty. He was ill-at-ease. His somewhat irregular marriage seemed unblest. He had no living children except one little girl and she was in

President's Address before the American Historical Association at Columbus, Ohio, December 27, 1923.

frail health. Early in that year a young lady came to court, black-eyed, vivacious, charming. With striking contemporaneity the king began to express doubts of the validity of his marriage with Catherine and to give evidence of having fallen in love with the new maid of honor. The story is a familiar one, in which the personal and public elements are indistinguishable. The unsuccessful negotiations with the pope, the divorce, the marriage with Anne, the statutory separation of the Church of England from Rome, the dissolution of the monasteries, the regulation of the Church by the State, changes in practice and doctrine, followed rapidly upon one another, till the whole course of the official English Reformation was run. What an enormous influence on the course of history to be exercised by the wayward passion of one human being!

In the middle of the fifth century a wild band of Orientals under the leadership of Attila the Hun, "the Scourge of God," swept through Gaul and Italy, burning, slaying, and plundering. They depleted populations, overthrew governments, desolated provinces, reduced to utter confusion the already wasted Empire. What an impression on history made by the destructive sweep of a barbarous horde through a civilized country!

Just a thousand years later, in 1347 and the years following, a new disease swept across Europe, the bubonic plague, the "Black Death," as it has been called. It was more devastating than the armies of Attila. High and low, old and young, clergy and laity, fell before its onset, till in many regions it is estimated that within a year one-half the population died instead of a twentieth, as in ordinary years. Great economic and social

changes took place during these years. Serfdom passed rapidly away, monks and nuns in the monasteries and even the secular clergy deteriorated, one form of Gothic architecture was abandoned and gave place to another. Such wide and varied effects on the course of history have been attributed by historians to this the most fatal of recorded epidemics.

As the war of the American Revolution progressed, disunion, disloyalty, incapacity appeared; jealousy between colonies and between officers weakened the army; languor among the people, inaction by Congress, discouragement of the leaders, all made the days dark and the outcome doubtful. But there was one great unfailing element of strength, the personality of Washington. He stood firm, he counselled wisely, he led skillfully. The ultimate success of the Revolution seems inseparably bound up with the character and the abilities of one man.

It is by this time quite sufficiently evident that I have been giving some almost chance examples of what are apparently great historical effects flowing from causes of a relatively simple, individual, casual character; a turn of the weather, an onset of ill-regulated royal passion, a fortuitous invasion by a fierce army or a destructive epidemic, the appearance of a great man. A thousand such instances might readily be adduced. They have often been stated with high authority. An article in the American Historical Review some years ago was entitled "Wednesday, August 19th, 1812, 6.30 P. M., the Birth of a World Power"; that date marking the defeat of the *Guerrière* by the *Constitution*. On this day and at this hour, according to Mr.

Charles Francis Adams, and as the result of a naval battle, the United States emerged into international recognition. Another former president of this Association, the master of us all in the field of English constitutional history, has remarked that Edward I would probably have taken measures to prevent the growth of a strong parliament if he had foreseen the danger to the monarchy involved in such an institution. That is to say, a certain king in the thirteenth century would have defined the future direction of development of the English Parliament. My allotted time this evening could easily be filled with a mere enumeration of instances where great and general effects are asserted to have followed upon certain accidental or personal causes.

But are these statements of cause and effect true, or are the appearances deceptive? Have these events and personalities really had the influence on the course of history so easily and naturally attributed to them? A hasty re-examination of the instances I have taken may suggest the need of a more adequate explanation. Although the wind blew from the southwest on the tenth of August, 1588, it did not blow adversely for the Spaniards through the whole eighteen years of the Elizabethan war. Yet Spain never successfully invaded England. Moreover, as we compare the two countries it becomes doubtful whether, even if Spanish troops had landed on the shores of England, any serious influence would have been exerted on the general course of the history of the two countries. Spain, over-strained by too ambitious undertakings, unsupported by ade-

quate economic resources, deficient in statesmanship, was an anæmic giant, holding her predominance in Europe with a constantly slackening hand. England, of youthful vigor, hardening Protestantism, rapidly increasing wealth, an exhilarating sense of her own nationality, was of almost unlimited, if undisciplined, powers, and was especially resistant to all forms of foreign control. Whether a Spanish or an English wind blew on a certain day really made little difference. England was bound to remain independent of Spain.

Can anyone believe there would have been no Reformation in England in the sixteenth century if Henry VIII had not fallen in love with Anne Boleyn? As we follow the stream of English history downward toward 1527, evidences of an approaching religious struggle are visible on every hand. There was much native heresy. The influence of Luther was active at Cambridge, in London, and through the eastern counties while Henry VIII was still living happily with Catherine and writing essays in support of the pope. The monarchy was becoming constantly stronger and threatening to come into conflict with the old claims of the Church to semi-independence. Many of the monasteries were bankrupt and could have continued to exist but a little longer at best. Change was in the air; economic change, political change, intellectual change. Is it likely the Church alone would remain unchanged? A breach with the medieval Church took place in all the northern countries of Europe. Would England have been an exception? I think it is safe to say that the Reformation would have occurred in England at about the time it

did and about in the form it did, if Henry VIII had never seen Anne Boleyn, indeed if Henry VIII had never lived.

Much the same observations are true of the American Revolution. During our whole colonial period the forces that worked for divergence from the mother country were active. The habits of a people growing up in a new country, three thousand miles in distance and several weeks in time from the ruling state, the diversity of religious opinion that had driven so many of them from home and that continued to increase, the conflicting economic interests of England and her American colonies, were all permanent influences that tended to separation. Independence sooner or later was natural, because of the difference of our institutions, possible, because of our size and numbers, inevitable, because of the stolid and narrow-minded type of government of England. American independence as we look on it now was not the creation of Washington and the "Fathers," but a necessary result of the divergence of the two countries.

So it is with the other instances. How little occasion the modern historian engaged in tracing the fall of the Roman Empire and the transformation of Roman institutions in the fifth century finds even for a mention of Attila! Every successive student of social and economic change in the fourteenth century gives less consideration to the "Black Death," and more to that gradual, obscure, and almost imponderable disintegration of the early medieval type of society which gave its character to that period. As to August 19th, 1812, the United States would soon have emerged into world

significance, if the battle between the *Guerrière* and the *Constitution* had gone the other way, just as the Western world would have been discovered by Cabral in 1500 if it had not been discovered by Columbus in 1492. Similarly as one traces the contemporaneous development of the House of Commons in England, the Estates General in France, the Cortes in Spain, and the Reichstag in Germany in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, each subject to the influences of its own environment yet each going through a similar course, one has grave doubts whether Edward I could have seriously influenced English parliamentary growth even if to his other abilities as a statesman should have been added prophetic insight into the future.

These great changes seem to have come about with a certain inevitableness; there seems to have been an independent trend of events, some inexorable necessity controlling the progress of human affairs. If a hundred instances were taken instead of five or six, all would show the same result. Examined closely, weighed and measured carefully, set in true perspective, the personal, the casual, the individual influences in history sink in significance and great cyclical forces loom up. Events come of themselves, so to speak; that is, they come so consistently and unavoidably as to rule out as causes not only physical phenomena but voluntary human action.

So arises the conception of *law in history*. History, the great course of human affairs, has not been the result of voluntary effort on the part of individuals or groups of individuals, much less of chance; but has been subject to law.

This is an old conception. It was formulated in one of the earliest written productions that time has left us. In the papyrus of the "Precepts of Ptah Hotep," it is said: "Never hath that which men have prepared for come to pass; for what the deity hath commanded, even that thing cometh to pass." Providence, fate, destiny, law, has controlled the affairs of man, as it has of men, as it controls all things. Few indeed are the paths we follow through this our universe without soon seeing stretching out before us, however dimly, the broad highway of law. So Lucifer, according to the poet, discovered.

"On a starred night Prince Lucifer uprose.
Tired of his dark dominions swung the fiend
Above the rolling ball in cloud part screened,
Where sinners hugged their spectre of repose.
Poor prey to his hot fit of pride were those.
And now upon his western wing he leaned,
Now his huge bulk o'er Afric's sands careened;
Now the black planet shadowed Arctic snows.
Soaring through wider zones that pricked his scars
With memory of the old revolt from Awe,
He reached a middle height, and at the stars,
Which are the brain of heaven, he looked, and sank.
Around the ancient track marched, rank on rank,
The army of unalterable law."

Human history, like the stars, has been controlled by immutable, self-existent law, by what Mr. Gladstone in his sonorous eloquence once described in Parliament as "those great social forces which move on in their might and majesty, and which the tumult of our de-

bates does not for a moment impede or disturb." Men have on the whole played the parts assigned to them; they have not written the play. Storms and pestilences and battles and revolutions have been of great significance to participants in them, and have seemed so to those who have chronicled their details, but they have really been only ripples and eddies in the great stream. Powerful rulers and gifted leaders have seemed to choose their policies and sometimes to carry them out, but their choice and the success with which they have been able to impose their will on their times have alike depended on conditions over which they have had little control.

Why should a labored argument be required to prove that human affairs are subject to law? Man has a body, which is subject to physical and chemical and biological law. Heat and gravitation and metabolism act upon him exactly as they act on other organic substances, and these forces act according to already formulated or about-to-be-formulated law. The processes of the minds of men, individually and in groups, are fast being explained by psychological and social laws. Man is simply a part of a law-controlled world.

Do not say that daily experience is against the rule of law in history. The laws that govern the course of history may be no more apparent than the laws that govern the winds and the storms. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof but canst not tell whence it cometh nor whither it goeth." Yet no one doubts that the blowing of the wind is subject to the laws of physics. The variety and the wilful-

ness and the unaccountableness are in the complexity of the phenomena, not in the underlying fixity of the law.

If all this is true; if history, like everything else in the rational universe, is subject to law, or laws, can these be found? What are these laws like? Are they like objective statutes, or like the subjective laws of mathematics and logic, or like physical laws, or biological laws, or economic or moral laws? There is but one way to find out—to do as others in their various fields have done before, to consider the phenomena, to make a more or less happy guess at some large principle, then test it by a wider comparison with the facts; if so be that a generalization can be found which we can fairly call a law of history. When we have found it we shall know what it is like.

To call the six statements I am about to make a tentative formulation of historical law would be an extreme exaggeration of my claims and even of my hopes. No assertion of humility is too strong, no conviction of uncertainty too assured, no realization of incompetence too profound to describe the state of mind of a serious student of history who sets about the task of reducing its vast multifariousness to simplicity, or who undertakes to find the law or laws which underlie its apparent lawlessness. Yet laws of history there must be, and my guesses at some of them are these.

Looking over the field of history there is evidently a law of continuity. "There is no new thing under the sun." All events, conditions, institutions, personalities, come from immediately preceding events, conditions, in-

stitutions, personalities. This is a familiar observation and will probably be readily accepted. It is the continuity of history that makes possible the popular and fascinating search for origins. Starting with almost any historic phenomenon we may trace it or its progenitors back and back into a time in which only Mr. Wells and Professor Robinson feel at home; and doubtless, with some assistance from the historic imagination, trace it and its descendants forward and forward into a time in which only Mr. Wells feels at home, all without any breach of continuity.

Yet this conception of the continuity of history, this historic law, so familiar to the modern historian, is comparatively new in historical writing and still unfamiliar to people in general. In popular belief Augustus founded the Roman Empire, Luther began the Reformation, Gutenberg invented printing, Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence, the Kaiser started the Great War; yet none of these statements satisfies the thoughtful historian. Each used materials ready to his hand. Actual origins elude us; everything is the outcome of something preceding; the immediate, sudden appearance of something, its creation by an individual or a group at some one moment of time, is unknown in history.

We say sometimes that a certain event came like a thunderbolt from a clear sky. But that is a mere form of speech. Thunderbolts do not come from a clear sky; they come from unobserved clouds. So the apparent suddenness of an historical event is only the measure of our carelessness of observation. Lowell points out that it was so of the French Revolution.

"As flake by flake the beetling avalanches
Build up their imminent crags of noiseless snow,
Till some chance thrill the loosened ruin launches,
And the blind havoc leaps unwarned below;
So grew and gathered through the silent years
The madness of a people, wrong by wrong.
There seemed no strength in the dumb toiler's tears,
No strength in suffering; but the Past was strong.
The brute despair of trampled centuries
Leaped up with one hoarse yell and snapped its bands,
Groped for its right with horny calloused hands,
And stared around for God with bloodshot eyes."

The continuity of history is not merely a fact; it is a law. By no voluntary action can any great breach of historical continuity be accomplished. The English parliamentary leaders of 1649 might abolish the kingship and the House of Lords and found a republic; but they could not prevent the government of England drifting back through the Protectorate and the Restoration to a monarchy but little changed from its old form and powers. The French revolutionists might attempt to make all things new; but little by little they were forced to submit to the law of continuity and restore the church, the monarchy, the nobility, and much of the social system as they had existed before 1789. And now poor Russia, perhaps poor Germany, is finding how incapable a nation is of making any complete break in historical development. Institutions have been modified, not destroyed; races have been subjugated or absorbed, not exterminated; beliefs have altered, not ceased; human history is an unbroken narrative.

Secondly, looking over the past, there seems to be

a law of impermanence, of mutability. The fall of empires is one of the most familiar of historic phenomena. It would be too trite to enumerate Assyria and Babylon and Egypt and Persia, Greece and Rome, Spain and Germany, the Lydians, the Medes, the Tartars, the Moguls, the Turks. We should have to add to them the unknown peoples and cultures that have left behind them only the mysterious ruins of Yucatan and Mashonaland and Mongolia—nations happy, presumably, since they certainly have no annals,—the men who created the gigantic figures on Easter Island, the builders of Stonehenge and Carnac and the Druid circles and the long lines of standing stones on the bare hills that fringe the Western shores of Europe. Even then we should have named only the most conspicuous instances. So persistent and infinitely repeated has been this disappearance of successive organizations of men and types of civilization that it gives every indication of being the result of a law rather than a mere succession of chances.

The clue to such a law may possibly be found in a biological analogy. Biologists have long observed that organic species highly specialized and suited to only one environment or mode of existence tend to become extinct. They have not been adaptable, and have therefore died out, while the ever active causes of evolution have produced new species from older and simpler stocks to take their place. Palæontology, the study of life in the geologic past, is largely occupied with species specially adapted to one set of circumstances and therefore unable to survive in another.

We are not concerned here with the origin or the

survival of man as an animal species. His physical and mental conformation seem to have become established in an early interglacial or even preglacial period and not to have changed materially since. His mental powers have enabled him in a considerable degree to control his environment; he seems to have powers of adaptation and therefore of physical survival unrivalled by any other animal. But socially, politically, in organized bodies, his fate has been a much more unstable one. It is with man in this capacity that we are occupied in this search for law; with his life in groups during the few thousand years of recorded history whose phenomena we are trying to reduce to some kind of order. Groups of men have, like animal and vegetable species, tended to run out. Apparently peoples, races, nations, have "struck their pace"; they have become differentiated from other peoples, characterized by their own physical, mental, and cultural differences, which, though of a minor character compared with the differences of species, have given them a dangerous fixity of type. They have ceased to be adaptable; politically and socially they are no longer capable of change or of conformity to a changing world. Populations insufficiently responsive to changed requirements of subsistence, to the pressure of competing nations, to new inventions or new ideas, have stolidly awaited conquest or absorption or transformation. The law of mutability, of decay of nations, is a measure of man's incapacity to change his habits. Unless nations can change as the times change they must die.

Conservatism, therefore, with a curious inversion of its intention, brings about the destruction of the group

of fixed institutions it wishes to preserve. One hundred per cent Americanism is more dangerous to the perpetuity of American institutions than a less percentage would be. Established formulas, traditional conceptions, fixed legal principles, dominating ideals, are the marks of a highly specialized, unadaptable, unchanging community, and, however elevated or admirable, are forces tending, under this historic law, to its ultimate destruction. Fundamentalism is self-destructive. "The letter killeth, the spirit maketh alive." It has only been the amendment and the stretching of the Constitution of the United States that have enabled us to survive politically under it. It has only been the abandonment of the old imperial ideas that has kept the British Empire in existence. Elasticity, adaptiveness, capacity to conform to change, are the requisites for survival of a race, of a nation, of a type of civilization. The absence of these has brought about their fall. Perhaps an America scornful of a League of Nations, wedded to isolation, struggling to keep her life separate, unconformable to a world that has been made essentially one by economic and intellectual changes, may not be able to survive. Thus the law of mutability, of instability of nations, will receive one more illustration.

Thirdly, looking over the field of history there seems to be a law of interdependence—interdependence of individuals, of classes, of tribes, of nations. The human race seems to be essentially an organism, a unit. As Paul said, we are "every one members one of another." No part of the human race in history has really progressed by the injury of another. We have all risen or fallen together. Conquests of one people by another

have always demoralized the conquerors. Success in war has generally introduced lower standards, less individual freedom, less tolerance, less elevation of spirit. The Persians after their conquests in Asia, Athens when she dominated the Delian League, Rome when she was mistress of the world, the Roman Catholic Church when its alliance with the temporal power had given it supremacy, Britain when she ruled over a group of forcibly annexed dependencies, the Allies after the downfall of Napoleon, Germany after 1871, were, according to the judgment of many of their own contemporary and national historians, defeated morally; and who shall say that France and Italy, England and the United States, are freer and better countries since the Great War than before? The fruits of victory have often proved to be apples of Sodom, turning to dust in the mouth.

So it has been with divided races and classes. Dependent races have been the curse of the ruling race. The Helots of Sparta, the Allies of Rome, Ireland under England, have been constant sources of weakness to their masters. Slaveholding classes have been forced into cruelty, shaken by vague fears of servile revolt, weakened by exemption from wholesome labor. Slaves and dependents, on the other hand, have been cowardly, deceitful, unenterprising, incapable of progress. The division into two classes has been demoralizing to both. The abolition of slavery and the freeing of dependents has been a condition precedent to any considerable economic or political or moral advancement for either class. Landholding and employing classes without sense of responsibility to their tenants or employees have

often been so blinded by class interest as to be a danger to the well-being of the whole community; and the same is true of irresponsible tenant and employed classes. No class can safely rule over or be ruled by another class.

Nations also are interdependent. Years ago, at a meeting of the Historical Association similar to this, a high-minded American diplomat remarked that he had attended the Algeciras Conference with the single preoccupation of using his influence for the sole benefit of the United States. I believed then and believe now that in so doing and at the same time expecting that the best results would follow for the United States he was neglecting this law, and the course of events has justified the belief. Nationalism, highly developed and without sense of responsibility for the well-being of other nations, is perhaps the most complete antithesis to human interdependence. It was the ultimate cause of the late war and is the threatening occasion for one to come. The world is even now watching to see whether one nation can by violence reimburse itself for its losses from another without, like Samson, bringing the temple of its own prosperity and that of all Europe down in ruins in the process. Can Germany be depressed while France and her allies are exalted, or will the law of interdependence act and all be depressed together? For I am not contending that human interdependence is an aspiration, a hope of the idealist; but that it is a law, to which the realist is just as subject as the idealist, inexorable in its workings, beyond our control, immanent in the conditions to which mankind has been and is subject.

Fourthly, there seems to be a law of democracy, a tendency for all government to come under the control of all the people. There has been a belief popular at certain times, especially among monarchs, that monarchy is the form of government preferred by an all-controlling Providence. But monarchies have been no more stable, as they have been no more wise, than other forms of government. There has been on the contrary a clear and, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a rapidly growing tendency to the overthrow or limitation of government carried on by a single individual. Autocratic monarchy has practically disappeared.

Again, there has been at certain times, there exists still, especially among men of aristocratic temperament, a belief that oligarchy in one or other of its forms is the normal type of government; that government should rest in the hands of a specially endowed, specially trained, or specially trusted group of people. There has appeared within the last few years, especially in the United States, a considerable body of writing opposing control by the mass of the people over their representatives, administrative, legislative, and judicial. Organizations have been formed and an active propaganda carried on with the object of preventing the advance of democracy. I believe these men are setting themselves in opposition to a law of history.

Every invention that makes easier the diffusion of information, every increase in the mobility and alertness of mind of the mass of the people, every rise in the standard of life, draws a larger part of the people into contact with the problems of government. Education

brings a sense of power over government; moral training brings a sense of responsibility for the uses to which government may be put. Printing, steam and electrical transmission, the use of the radio, popular education, increased wages, the progress of thought, leisure, all tend to extend democracy. These are practically irresistible forms of advance and the resultant advance of democracy therefore cannot be prevented. Our own generation has seen the introduction in all progressive countries of an additional half of the population into the political sphere, and the dikes set up against the spread of popular government have been overflowed in all directions. Moreover democracy has on the whole justified its existence and made probable its permanence by more wise legislation and administration than any other form of government has given. This is perhaps a hard saying, but a careful historical comparison of the works of autocracy, aristocracy, so-called representative government, and democracy will show, I believe, greater vigor, greater ability, greater justice, and greater enlightenment in the service of the last than in either of the others. It is easy to see defects in existent democracy, but the historian will have a long and I believe a vain search for a wiser government in the past.

Again, democracy is being extended to other interests of mankind than those traditionally considered as political. The absolute control of economic life by the possessors of capital has long been recognized to be disadvantageous to society and has been limited in various ways. Of recent decades, in various countries, under the leadership for the most part of enlightened

employers, something approaching industrial democracy has been introduced in its place. Partial control of trade interests has been placed in the hands of all those connected with the trade, instead of being left in the hands of one class. In other cases the modern democratic state has drawn industry more or less within its own sphere. It would seem that the law of democracy is subjecting this group of men's interests also to its sway.

If the arguments for the existence of this historical law seem to be drawn from the phenomena of a more recent period than for the other laws it may perhaps be attributed to its overwhelming interest in the immediate past and in the present. A world war to which the genius of one American President gave dignity and unity by describing it as a war to make the world safe for democracy, just as a former President had at Gettysburg declared the war he was waging to be for the preservation of democracy in the United States, has nevertheless placed in power in almost every country a dictator or a majority whose belief in democracy is hesitant and incomplete. If a law of democracy exists, this condition can only be temporary; the law will soon again work with compelling force. If there is no such law, we are adrift on a sea whose winds and tides and shores are all unknown. Who would not trust, if he may, the instincts and aspirations of the mass of the people in the passage perilous of the next few years, rather than the vagaries of a Mussolini, the obstinacy of a Poincaré, the pedantry of a Lenin, or the narrow vision and restricted interests of any one class of the people?

Fifthly, looking over the field of history I am convinced there is a law of necessity for free consent. Human beings are free agents in their relations to other human beings; they cannot permanently be compelled. Not only should all government be by the consent of the governed but in the long run all government is by the consent of the governed. When men have not been willing to give their consent they have found numberless ways to avoid acceptance. They have protested, they have refused to acknowledge authority, they have refrained from action, they have resisted, they have rebelled; as a last resort they have allowed themselves to be put to death. It is consent, not force, that has on the whole held society together, that has supported governments, that has procured services. The consent has often been reluctant, it has never been actually forced. When forced it has not been consent, but mere temporary yielding to violence, and violence has borne little fruit of achievement or permanence.

It has lately been said in excuse for his action by one of the European dictators that freedom has failed and force is the only remedy. Making a wider survey of history I should say rather that force has failed and freedom is the only remedy. Nothing has ever been really settled till the consent of all concerned has been obtained. Bismarck's "blood and iron," as a means of settlement of the internal affairs of Germany, has already proved itself not a settlement. It could and did bring about a temporary cessation of conflict, but that is hardly a settlement in the long view of history which lasts scarcely half a century. A settlement, if this is a true historic law, requires a genuine acquiescence,

however reluctant, in the arrangements being made. The peace of 1871 was evidently vitiated from the beginning by the German seizure, against French protest, of Alsace-Lorraine. When the German representative and one of the most enlightened representatives of the Allies affixed their signatures to the treaty of 1919 under a similar protest, they were simply giving notice of what soon became evident, that consent to the Treaty of Versailles had not been obtained. The poor wreckage of peace that now encumbers Europe gives sad testimony to the working of the law in this case. The law of free consent has doubtless been disregarded more than it has been obeyed, but it is none the less a law, violation of which has been followed by failure to obtain the advantages that conformity to it would have entailed. If a peace had been drawn up at Versailles to which the consent of Germany had been asked and obtained, the world might now be relatively prosperous and free from dread of the future. The effects of force in history have been temporary and partial and illusory; voluntary acceptance alone has been permanent and adequate and substantial.

Sixthly, and lastly, so far as this groping search extends, there seems to be a law of moral progress. Obscurely and slowly, yet visibly and measurably, moral influences in human affairs have become stronger and more widely extended than material influences. The desire for the wealth or the territory or the enslavable population of another region was considered sufficient excuse for attack upon it by an early ruler, and sufficient explanation for the attack by an ancient historian. If other than material causes are offered as

explanations by Herodotus or Xenophon or Polybius or Livy they are of a low order, revenge or ambition, perhaps, instead of acquisitiveness. Mere plunder or a claim of feudal superiority was the basis of most mediæval wars. In later times better reasons have been offered, have indeed existed. National independence or security, local liberties, religious or political sympathy, protection of the oppressed, the defense of an ideal,—the professed motives for which modern governments and nations have gone to war,—belong to a higher group of incentives than those of the wars of antiquity or the Middle Ages. Camouflage these may partly be. President Wilson may have been correct in his statement that the recent great war arose primarily from economic causes; but the fact remains that many higher questions were involved. The people, always more moral than their rulers, would not at any time within the last four centuries have supported their governments in wars merely for plunder, aggression, revenge or economic imperialism. Other passions have been called into play.

If moral ideals have become increasingly predominant in the heat and unreason of war, it will be readily believed that they have asserted themselves with still more rapidly increasing force in the realm of peace. The disappearance of slavery, of serfdom, of the whipping of soldiers and sailors, criminals, apprentices, and school children, the diminution of personal oppression, of man's physical and legal power over women, of the greater advantages granted by the law to employers over employees and to landlords over tenants, the spread of sympathy, of mercy, of helpfulness, are just

so many proofs of the existence of a law of moral progress.

Not only intensively but extensively moral forces have tended to become predominant. There was a time when fidelity to contract, justice, mercy, applied only within the family. The validity of these principles gradually extended from the family to the tribe, to the nation, and now in these later ages from the nation to international relations. *Vae victis* was, in the mouth of Brennus the Gaul, sufficient defense for his harsh peace with the Romans; to Mr. Wilson and Lloyd George, mistaken though they may have been, the Treaty of Versailles was a "peace of justice." In moments of depression concerning present international relations it may be a solace to consider how recently humanity has risen to the realization of its international duties, and yet how sure is its progress toward that realization, for it is a progress governed by law.

Such are some general laws I have ventured to state as discoverable by a search among historical phenomena: first, a law of continuity; second, a law of permanence through change; third, a law of interdependence among all members of the race; fourth, a law of democracy; fifth, a law of freedom of consent; sixth, a law of moral progress.

May I repeat that I do not conceive of these generalizations as principles which it would be well for us to accept, or as ideals which we may hope to attain; but as natural laws, which we must accept whether we want to or not; whose workings we cannot obviate, however much we may thwart them to our own failure and disadvantage; laws to be reckoned with, much as

are the laws of gravitation, or of chemical affinity, or of organic evolution, or of human psychology.

An urgent question concerning such laws must arise in every thoughtful mind. How much opportunity does the existence of historical law leave for the free choice and free action of men? This may perhaps be answered by asking how much opportunity does the existence of physical law leave to the builder, the engineer, the navigator, the aviator? As much freedom as he is able to utilize, apparently. How much opportunity do the laws of chemistry leave to the metallurgist, the maker of dyes or explosives, the synthetic chemist? Enough apparently for him to work what seem miracles to us laymen. How much freedom in thinking do the laws of psychology leave to the scientist, the philosopher, the historian? Law in these fields does not bind thought or make man powerless, it only lays down the conditions under which he must think and act. The same is doubtless true of law in history.

If it be said that the laws I have used as analogies are laws of external nature, whereas history involves the element of the human will, it may be asked just how far any one of us is free and how far he is restricted in his individual actions? A man can live only in a certain period, neither in any earlier or later time. Ordinarily he can live only in one particular country and in the midst of one set of social and political conditions. He can possess only his own heredity. His physical and mental natures are drawn entirely from his ancestors. He has no capacities or proclivities that have not come to him through his inheritance. We are controlled at every turn by the natural laws of the

world in which we dwell. And yet we feel free to act much as we choose. If our action is not entirely free it simulates freedom. We are so used to our limitations that it is only exceptionally that we feel them. Individually we find a wide field of activity within the limits that condition and to a great degree control our action. We are free to act, subject to irresistible law in the background. We may have only a margin of freedom, but that margin is wide enough for judgment, effort, self-sacrifice, cowardice, heroism; for foolishness and wisdom, for weakness and strength.

Man historically has been in much the same position as men individually. He has been able to deflect slightly to one side or another the law-controlled course of events. He has been able to give special shape to general movements. If his action has been conformable to law it has been effective; when he has worked along with the great forces of history he has influenced constructively the course of events; when his action has violated historic law the results have been destructive, momentary, subject to reversal. Men always have been and are free to act; the results of their actions will depend on the conformity or nonconformity of these actions to law.

Finally, I wish to call attention to the great value the discovery of such laws might have in the attainment of human happiness. If the laws that control human history can really be discovered and formulated, the service to mankind will be far greater than that of the discovery of physical or psychological or even biological law. For one of the prime characteristics of law is that it is invariable. It acts in the present and

will act in the future as it has in the past, and mankind sadly needs a guide for action in the present and for the future.

The knowledge of history has been of little practical value so far. "History teaches" is a formula that we often hear, but the thoughtful man gets little satisfaction from its use. He knows that history has been made to teach whatever is wished. Catholicism and Protestantism, militarism and pacifism, monarchy and republicanism, individualism and mass action, high tariffs and free trade, bimetallism and a gold standard, all appeal with equal confidence to the lessons of history. As a matter of fact, the treasure-house of history is so rich that all kinds of precedents can be drawn from it. It is a poor policy that cannot find some historical justification. An ingenious and industrious advocate can always find in history the arguments he wants. But so can his opponent; arguments from history are generally inconclusive except to those who are already convinced. There is no common agreement on what history teaches. This is partly because we have been able to reason from history only by analogy, and the analogy is never perfect; the historical example is never precisely like the present problem. History never repeats itself exactly. Some factors are the same, others are different. History teaching by example is a poor teacher.

It is true that the study of history is peculiarly enlightening. It teaches its votaries wisdom, if it does not teach specific lessons. Moderation, sanity, insight into the affairs of men in the present doubtless come to the historian as he studies the doings of men in the past.

He may be, probably is, more likely to be right than other men in his judgments on current events. But wisdom is not transferable, and the historian has little leverage in persuading his fellow men to accept his judgment. The rôle of Cassandra is at best an unprofitable one.

We sometimes claim that history interprets the present. That is true; it is the only clue to the present. But this also is a cold comfort. The present is so momentary. While we are speaking, while we are thinking, the present slips back into the past, and the future bears down upon us. For practical uses, if history is to have a practical use, what we need is a clue to the future. This a knowledge of the laws of history might give us. If we knew the laws of history we might reason and act with the same intelligence and precision and anticipation of success with which the engineer acts in conformity with the known laws of physics, or the astronomer with the laws of astronomy, or the cattle breeder with the Mendelian law of inheritance.

So assured is this hope that I look forward to some future meeting of this Association when the search for the laws of history and their application will have become the principal part of its procedure. Many of the sessions of such a meeting will be devoted, as now, to the difficult, interesting and fruitful work of making clear the events of history, and their proximate causes and effects; other sessions will doubtless be given to the perennial task of discussing how and why history should be taught in the schools; the President will no doubt recapitulate recent progress or commend or chide his colleagues for what they have done or left undone,

or speculate on the larger implications of his subject. But the most conspicuous place on the programme will be assigned to some gifted young historical thinker who, quite properly, disregarding the early and crude efforts of his predecessors, will propound and demonstrate to the satisfaction of all his colleagues some new and far-reaching law or laws of history. Other sessions will be devoted to applying to some of the political and social and economic problems of the day well-known and by that time universally accepted historical laws. Then indeed will the leaves of the tree the historians have planted be for the healing of the nations.

II

THE AGITATOR IN HISTORY

HERE was a man whose name was John. He dwelt in the wilderness of Judæa and wore raiment of camel's hair with a leathern girdle about his loins. He drank no wine and ate for meat only the native products of the desert. He preached communism, summoning the people to divide their food and their raiment equally. He demanded no narrow obedience to a tribal deity, but declared that God could from the stones of the desert raise up children unto Abraham; that every man and every institution must be tested not by conformity to some established system, but by its good to humanity, that "every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire." He was no reed shaken by the wind; in the desert he waxed strong in spirit. He lashed the pride of Pharisee and Sadducee, the great men of his time and nation, calling them a generation of vipers; he bade the soldier do no violence, the tax collector practice no extortion, and the king put away his illegal wife. The end came soon; imprisonment, the bitterness of a woman's hurt pride, the witch-

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ery of a young girl's dancing, the haughty fidelity of an oriental despot to his chance-given word, the stroke of the executioner, and the silent voice and closed lips and bloody hair of the head of John the Baptist on a charger. Such was the end of his apostolate,—failure, early death, oblivion. Except for his precursorship to another and a greater career his very name and existence would have remained unknown to any later time.

John the Baptist has come down through history as the type of a whole class of visionaries. They have lived, like him, metaphorically, if not actually, in the wilderness, apart from the great body of their fellow men. Their ways were not the ways of other men, their interests were not other men's interests. They would not submit to the government of their time. They spoke against the way of life of the most influential of the people. They proposed impracticable plans. John the Baptist is but an early example of a long series of men in hopeless opposition to authority, out of line with society in their time, unpractical, fanatical men. They are men whose hearts have burned within them at the sight of sin, or oppression, or injustice, or poverty, but whose eyes have not seen the world in a clear perspective, or whose ears have not listened to the teachings of prudence, or whose minds have not been schooled to moderation. How shall we interpret their position in the history of the race? What function have they fulfilled in social economy?

They are familiar figures in the records of the past. Almost contemporary with John the Baptist, at the centre of the great Roman Empire of which Palestine had recently become a remote and obscure appendage,

two brothers, Tiberius and Caius Gracchus came into prominence. Each was elected in turn as tribune of the people; they introduced laws intended to divide among the common people of Rome the lands conquered by the armies and to give to the people a larger share in their own government. They saw during a short period the victory of the principles they advocated, but ultimately they failed and their laws were repealed. One of the brothers died stricken down in the streets of Rome by the weapons of the mob, the other in the Grove of the Furies stabbed by a slave.

Far away both from Palestine and Rome, and a thousand years later in time, another voice was heard crying in the wilderness, in the wilderness of serfdom and feudal tyranny and church privilege. This man's name also was John,—John Ball. He gathered the people around him in the English churchyards after service and said to them, "Ah, ye good people, the matters goeth not well to pass in England, nor shall not do till everything be common, and that there be no villains nor gentlemen, but that we may be all united together and that the lords be no greater masters than we. What have we deserved or why should we be thus kept in serfage? We be all come from one father and one mother, Adam and Eve; whereby can they say or shew that they be greater lords than we be? . . . They are clothed in velvet and camlet furred with grise, and we be vestured with poor cloth; they have their wines, spices and good bread, and we have the rye, the bran and the straw, and drink water; they dwell in fair houses and we have the pain and the travail, rain and

wind in the fields; they keep their estates by our labors and we are called their bondmen."

We hear that "the people murmured in the fields and in the ways as they went together, affirming how John Ball said truth." From 1370 to 1381, all through the country-side old rhymes were quoted,

"When Adam dalf and Eva span
Who was then the gentleman?"

or

"John the Miller hath ground small, small, small,
The King's son of heaven shall pay for all."

The people seemed ready to throw off the yoke, to root out the tares of unjust judges and evil lords, and like the husbandman in the Bible gather into their barns the good wheat of freedom, peace and equality. But it was not to be; instead, a few wild weeks of revolt sweeping over England, then the people were beaten down; the power of king, judges and landlords reestablished; John Ball, the preacher to the people, the agitator, hung, his heart cast into the fire that burned below the gibbet and his limbs fastened over the gateways of Coventry and St. Albans as a warning to those who would preach revolt against authority.

And yet other men did not heed such warning. The halls of history resound with the voice of the agitator. Nor did they fail to receive honor. The squares and the streets of Old World cities are dotted with statues put up by later generations to commemorate those who stirred up the people of a generation before.

John the Baptist is now honored of all men. Altars were erected in Rome to the memory of the Gracchi. Close beside the steps that lead up the Capitoline Hill stands the bronze figure of Cola di Rienzi on the spot where after for a while leading the people in an effort to restore old Rome he fell trampled by them to death. From the windows of the Palazzo Vecchio we look down on the lofty figure of Savonarola, the preacher and reformer, standing where his body hung until it was consumed by the flames. In the market place of Ghent stands the statue of Jacques van Artevelde; the gigantic figure of Wallace overlooks from the heights of Stirling the Lowlands of Scotland, as that of Garibaldi looks down from the Janiculum on Rome.

Such another agitator was John Brown, leading a forlorn hope of a dozen young men in a reckless plan to bring about a rising of the slaves, against every dictate of wisdom, every canon of safety and every prospect of success. His fate was the familiar one as a few days later he walked in serene dignity to the scaffold of Charlestown, the long day of his career as agitator closing in darkness. Such an agitator, but five years ago, was the young Italian Arturo Giovanitti, stirring his fellow countrymen at Lawrence in Massachusetts to resistance to long hard hours, low wages, weariness, hopelessness, disappointment. He and his hearers had learned in the distant villages of Italy to reverence the land of liberty, and he and they alike had been disillusioned by the elusiveness of a liberty made fruitless by lack of opportunity. Charged with murder, imprisoned, harshly judged, a poet, a

dreamer, burdened with the same old heavy load of the world's sorrow, he is still the typical agitator, like many who have gone before him.

Needless to say it is no part of my duty to apportion blame or praise in these cases. The historian is not a judge, much less an all-knowing providence. He can only look back across the ages, see dimly the course of events, guess at the influence exerted by individual men or men of a certain type, and occasionally make a generalization, to be lightly held and dismissed if disproved.

The agitator in history, according to such a generalization, and as we have so far studied him, seems always to fail, at least so far as his immediate efforts are concerned,—so far as he has tried to guide men of his own time in some particular direction, to embody his dream in immediately realized actuality.

Yet the problem may be approached in a different way; from a study of the work accomplished and of the way in which it was accomplished, rather than of the men who have struggled and failed. So it may prove that the roll of the agitators in history may not have been fully called when we have searched the records of lost causes. There may have been among them men who were less of dwellers in the wilderness, less detached from their times, less lonely, less tragic in their fate; men with a mission that has dominated them as completely as those of John the Baptist or John Ball or John Brown of Osawatomie, and yet whose efforts did not come so hopelessly into conflict with forces too strong to be overcome. Late it may be, after long years of waiting, after many disappointments, after accept-

ing many changes from early plans, an agitator may occasionally have been able to say "Now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace."

Few periods of history have presented more instances of successful reform than England during the last century. All men now rejoice in these reforms. How were they attained? The slave trade between Africa and America, established in the sixteenth century, had grown into ever larger proportions during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and even into the nineteenth. The negroes were obtained on the coast of Guinea, at the mouth of the Congo and along the rivers between, by purchase from native chiefs or by kidnaping. One occurrence may be taken as an example. Two native chieftains, brothers, occupied adjoining towns separated only by a river. Their people were relatives and friends. An English slave trader won over one of them by gifts of liquor, guns and knives, to invite the neighboring tribe to feast in his village, then in the midst of the festivities to seize his visitors for sale to the trader. A battle ensued, and the survivors of the conquered and captured tribe, men, women, and children, were bound and carried to the slaving vessel waiting at the mouth of the river. Neither the lion, nor the cobra, nor the crocodile was the most dreaded enemy of the negro in Africa, but the Christian slave-trader. Women and children bathing in the rivers, men hunting in the forest, detached parties sleeping in their huts, if they neglected to watch, were the prey of the emissaries white or black of the slavers.

The captives were taken aboard the ships on the coast, the men in manacles, two and two. They were laid

on the lower decks and on shelves between the decks. Six feet in length, one foot four inches in width were allowed on a certain average vessel for each grown man lying on or between decks; the head room ranged from two feet six inches to three feet, so that in favorable situations men might sit up but never stand erect. Then began the long passage across the mid-Atlantic. In the day-time the negroes were brought in turns on deck. Nets were stretched around the gunwales of the ships to foil the frequent attempts at suicide by jumping overboard. Refusal to eat was punished by the whip and defiance by the pistol shot;—was it not well for one man to die rather than many? Yet suffocation, disease and settled melancholy caused many deaths. There were instances of mercy. Kindly ships' surgeons when they had to walk across the layers of negroes took off their shoes so as not to bruise their flesh or features. Sailors, even the sailors of the slave trade, disobeyed orders to whip little girls who, sick and sullen, refused their food till there was danger of their death. A black mother fell down and kissed the feet of a captain who by chance brought her own child, captured in a later raid, on the same vessel with her.

Usually more than half of those who had left Africa were brought successfully across; then they were sold to West India planters or dealers; such family connections as had survived the chances of capture in Africa were lost by the chances of sale, and men, women and children were absorbed into the mass of New World slavery. Among all the dark chapters of man's inhumanity to man which the recording angel, if such a supreme enemy to our race exists, has in his books, there

is surely none darker than the history of the slave trade.

And yet this trade went on. Shipowners of Bristol and Liverpool and the New England towns grew rich upon it, retired from business and forgot the sources of their wealth, at least in the day-time and when they were in good health. Planters came home from the slave colonies and settled in England. Wealthy and ultimately aristocratic families were established upon it. Young doctors went a voyage or two as slave-ship surgeons to obtain experience. It was a settled part of the institutions of society.

There was never an entire absence of protest. The Friends and a few scattered humanitarians spoke or wrote against it; but for a long time nothing was actually done. Yet as the eighteenth century passed on a change was apparent. Petitions against the slave trade began to make their way into parliament, the king appointed a committee of privy council to investigate it, a society for its abolition was formed. It was evident that some persistent, active, efficient force was giving definiteness and continuity and spirit to a movement of opposition. In doubtful cases of a certain kind we are told *cherchez la femme.* In reform movements, rather seek the agitator. He can usually be found. In the year 1785 a young Cambridge student, Thomas Clarkson, eager, gifted, ambitious, destined by his parents for the church, wrote a Latin prize essay on the subject appointed for the year, "*anne liceat invitos in servitutem dare,*"—"whether it is lawful to hand men over to involuntary servitude." In preparing for it he read all he could find written on slavery and the slave trade. He won the prize, but the subject

still haunted him. He was obsessed with it. The sufferings of the poor Africans, he tells us, were with him day and night in his study, on his walks and rides and in company. Finally he determined, deliberately and seriously, to give up his other prospects and to devote his life to the abolition of the slave trade.

In 1786 he took a momentous step; he determined to go back of all the second-hand and indirect knowledge and opinion, and to enter upon a first-hand study of the actual facts themselves. He went down to the London wharves and later to those of Bristol and Liverpool, visited ships that were engaged in the African trade, made his way into their holds, measured their length and breadth, talked with the sailors, sought out old ships' doctors and retired masters, made himself ridiculed, respected, feared and hated by the commercial classes in the slave-trading towns. He found other enthusiasts, among them Wilberforce, who rivalled him as the guiding spirit, though not as the working force. Whenever a parliamentary committee was to meet Clarkson had witnesses ready to appear; he started petitions, issued pamphlets, organized branches of the anti-slavery society, gave information, made addresses. In seven years he travelled some 35,000 miles in search of evidence, kept up a correspondence with over 400 persons and wrote a book or pamphlet each year. At last, just twenty years after its first introduction into parliament, the abolition law was passed and the slave trade was prohibited by both England and the United States in the same month of the same year, January, 1808. Clarkson was of course but one of many who carried on this agitation, but he was the type,

the leading figure, the representative. He lived to see the abolition bill carried, to write its history and to look back from a calm old age on universal approval of the great reform for which he had been a life-long agitator.

The slave trade was only the most conspicuous of the abuses of its time. The crimnial code was harsh and barbaric to the last degree. There were more than two hundred crimes on the statute book punishable by death, and England's penal code had gradually become probably the most harsh and sanguinary in the world. Some of the crimes thus punished had come from temporary causes, others were insignificant, and the harsh laws against them had been passed in moments of panic or anger. But all alike remained law when once they had been passed. Most of these laws were for the protection of property. A poacher catching fish in a private pond, a thief stealing as much as five shillings from a shop, a person found walking about at night disguised, the sender of a threatening letter through the mails, were all alike liable, if convicted, to be hung. It is true that under this code persons injured hesitated to prosecute, juries avoided giving verdicts of guilty and judges sentenced men only reluctantly. Nevertheless the odium of barbarity, the demoralization of irregular enforcement and frequent instances of cruel punishment all remained in existence. There is one of Tennyson's early poems, called "Rizpah,"—it is not generally included in his collected works but can be found in the Golden Treasury; if you do not mind having your heart broken, read it. It tells how a thoughtless lad, dared by his companions, stops the stage coach, robs one of the

passengers, and for the theft is hung in chains; how his mother, escaping from the madhouse, goes to the gibbet on the moor every dark night and gathers the bones of her son as they drop one by one from the decaying body, and then scratches a hole in the churchyard to bury them in holy ground. Her wild cry for her boy must have been echoed and re-echoed a thousand times through the cruel years in which that harsh system existed.

In 1786 Sir Samuel Romilly, a lawyer, later a member of parliament, took up the work of trying to reform this penal code. He became in a certain sense a professional agitator. He wrote a book on the subject, brought out successive editions, with new information and arguments, introduced into parliament measures for its reform, and spoke in frequent criticism of the law as it stood. His first success was in 1808 when he induced parliament to take away the death penalty for pocket-picking. But the House of Commons, alarmed at its liberality, refused to pass a law making the same change in the case of shop-lifting, and after this time bill after bill was defeated and year after year passed without success. When Romilly died in 1818 a protagonist for penal reform was not lacking, for his friend Sir James Mackintosh took up the work, and at last, in 1823, the worst of the death-penalty acts were removed from the statute book, and the basis for a more humane and reasonable system of punishments was laid.

During the same period many who were neither slaves nor criminals suffered because of the harshness or the neglect of the law. From the time of the invention and

introduction of the new spinning and weaving machinery, along the mill-bordered streams of Derbyshire and Lancashire and in the new manufacturing towns of Yorkshire, children from six to twelve years old, some bound, some free, but all neglected, overworked, and often abused, dragged out weary and miserable lives. The mill owners, carried away by the possibilities of the new machinery and new power, ran their mills twelve to fourteen hours a day for all employees alike, and preferred the services of women and children to those of men. In the same way, in the coal mines of the North of England women and children worked half clothed, through long hours, in water, bad air, darkness and danger until Sir Robert Peel, Robert Owen, Oastler, Lord Ashley and other humanitarians in a long struggle lasting from 1803 to 1847 carried the factory and mining acts which have become the basis for all later enlightened legislation in that field.

So one social change after another might be described. In 1773 John Howard was appointed sheriff of Bedfordshire and was astonished at the abuses he found in the county jail. He became more and more interested in the subject; when his last year of service was over he made a tour of inspection of all the jails in England, and subsequently visited the prisons of all the countries of Europe, and repeatedly examined those in his own country. He was able, before his death in 1790, to bring about a series of reforms which were of untold relief to men of his own and later times, and after his death a statue was erected to him in St. Paul's.

More purely political reforms ran much the same

course as those of a social nature. A representative system, imperfect from the beginning and long outworn, had placed the government of England in the hands of one privileged class of the people, and there it remained until an agitation for change initiated by the first Pitt, carried a step further by the second, and renewed by the reformers of the early years of the century, was at last carried through its first great stage by Earl Grey and Lord John Russell in the Reform Bill of 1832. The long and unjust exclusion of Roman Catholics and Dissenters from ordinary political rights was removed in much the same way, as the result of an agitation begun by Pitt in 1801 and completed by O'Connell and Peel in 1829.

As we look back on these reforms from the vantage point of a hundred years later and all agree that the arguments for them were overwhelming and their results obviously beneficent, the question naturally arises why they were so hard to achieve. Why did it take thirty-seven years for Romilly and Mackintosh to bring about the reform of the penal code; why were twenty years of active agitation required to abolish the slave trade; why were there thirty years of time, numberless debates and long campaigns of controversy between the first tentative factory act and the beginning of effective legislation: why did full forty years intervene between the defeat of the early bills for parliamentary reform and the passage of the act of 1832? What are the forces that so retarded the growth of reform?

The answer is, in the first place, ignorance. I do not mean general ignorance, but ignorance of the

special conditions it was proposed to alter. When Clarkson for the first time spoke to Pitt about the slave trade, he was amazed at the ignorance on this subject of so generally well-informed, so alert-minded and so experienced a man. The prime minister was evidently interested, but profoundly ignorant of the whole matter. The same he found to be true of Grenville and of most other Englishmen, even the most enlightened. The committee of parliament that investigated women's and children's labor in the mines likewise found conditions quite undreamed of by those who walked on the green English turf and worked in the soft sunshine above them. The description of English jails given by John Howard on his return from his first journey of investigation through England was so strange and new that he was called to the bar of the House of Commons to repeat the story. Country members could hardly believe that they had been so ignorant of what was in existence in their own county towns. Even judges and lawyers in the criminal courts were astonished at the plain statement of the facts when the penal code was spread before them.

Secondly, close upon ignorance came indifference. One of the great obstacles Clarkson had to overcome was general unconcern about the negroes and their fate. It required the stories of men who had actually participated in the slave trade, and printed pictures of the arrangement of the black cargo of a slaver to arouse men to thought about its possible abolition. The people of England took no interest in the movement for the enfranchisement of the Roman Catholics until the picturesque gatherings of the Irish peasantry on

the hillsides hallowed by their national legends were led to the very brink of civil war by the eloquence of O'Connell. So it was with the factory children. Most men not only did not know but did not care about them. When Mrs. Browning wrote

> "Do ye hear the children weeping, O my brothers,
> Ere the sorrow comes with years?"

and those other verses closing with the appeal

> "How long, they say, how long, O cruel nation
> Will you stand, to move the world, on a child's heart,
> Stifle down with a mailed heel its palpitation,
> And tread onward to your throne amid the mart?"

she brought poetry and pathos to bear on the problem of child labor and roused thousands of persons from an indifference proof against all other means of awakening serious thought on that subject.

Thirdly, fear. You remember how Fear came into the jungle:

> "Through the jungle very softly flits a shadow and a sigh,
> He is Fear, O Little Hunter, he is Fear.
> Very softly down the glade, runs a waiting, watching shade,
> And the whisper spreads and widens far and near;
> And the sweat is on thy brow, for he passes even now—
> He is Fear, O Little Hunter, he is Fear."

Fear of violence and crime and even of petty disorder helped to keep the savage penal laws upon the

statute book. Men are never so cruel as when they are afraid. It was fear that the people would take the government into their own hands and bring back the days of the French Revolution that strengthened the Tories to resist the popular demand for parliamentary reform. It was fear of papal interference that kept the government strong in its long resistance to the enfranchisement of the Roman Catholics. Fear of loss of a profitable branch of commerce and fear of a slave rising perpetuated the slave trade. Fear of the competition of other countries was long held to justify the manufacturers in their resistance to the factory acts. Men fear any change. It was the keenest of all observers of human nature that long ago pointed out that it was fear or "dread" that

> "Makes us rather bear those ills we have
> Than fly to others that we know not of."

and makes Hamlet confess:

> "Thus conscience does make cowards of us all
> And thus the native hue of resolution
> Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
> And enterprises of great pith and moment
> With this regard their current turn awry
> And lose the name of action."

Another obstacle that contemporary records seem to show standing in the way of social advance and making reform slower than it would otherwise have been was organized religion. The bishops in the House of Lords were an almost solid phalanx, voting uni-

formly and consistently against the great social and political reforms which have given their name and character to the period we are discussing. Of the majority in the House of Lords that so long blocked the amelioration of the penal code, a considerable portion were the bishops. Twice bills for the abolition of the slave trade passed in the House of Commons but were defeated in the House of Lords, the bishops all but unanimously voting against the proposed reform. The enfranchisement of the Roman Catholics was long successfully obstructed and at the last moment much endangered by the opposition of the clergy both of the established church and of the Dissenters. The bishops and most of the Anglican clergy were opposed to parliamentary reform, the Dissenters largely uninterested. The least regular of the religious denominations, the Quakers and the Unitarians, it is true, contributed much to the cause of reform, yet far the most part of he propaganda for humanitarian measures came from outside of the religious bodies altogether. It is a curious observation that heresy and reform have in all ages and countries so generally gone together.

Do not understand me to speak in disparagement of religion, to question its value, or even to deny the part that individual religious men have taken in movements for reform. In other connections than this tribute might well be paid to the deep significance of religion in human life. In the investigation with which we are now concerned, the forces that favored or retarded reform, its part was one of obstruction not advancement. As a plain historical fact the footsteps of the progress of humanity, during this period at least, neither entered

into nor emerged from the churches; they walked a different path. This can at least in part be readily explained. Religion in England at this time had its main embodiment in the established church. A hierarchy once established, a church endowed, legal rights obtained, social standing acknowledged, a creed and catechism formulated, and we have a group of the most nearly static institutions that human society has ever developed. Other reasons may have existed. To the devotee this earth is after all only a pilgrimage. What matter the miseries of a few short years compared with the infinite ages of eternity? Is it worth while to take any great interest in bettering the condition of this vale of tears? Was not the part of Pilgrim, who fled from the City of Destruction rather than stay to reform it, the better one? The strongly religious man, recognizing that the ways of Providence were past finding out, may have hesitated to interfere with the divine guidance of the world. He might have said: "It is God's world, not ours; if there is injustice and inequality and suffering, they may be here for a purpose, and we should accept them, not struggle to get rid of them; submission, not alteration, should be the object of our efforts." Whether this opposition to reform was inherent in the established church or in the religious spirit, or only a chance accompaniment of them in the period and circumstances we have been studying, the historical fact remains that it was against much religious opposition, either active or passive, that the reforms I have described were attained.

One might feel the same hesitation as in the case of organized religion, fear of misunderstanding, in de-

scribing another obstacle, the existing law and its officers. The most consistent, active and influential individual opponent of reform during the period from which I have drawn my examples was probably Lord Eldon, lord chief justice of England. Nor was this a personal idiosyncrasy; it was characteristic of the courts and the legal profession. Lord Lyndhurst and Lord Ellenborough took the same position on most questions of reform as did Lord Eldon. When the early opponents of the slave trade began their efforts they found that the action of the magistrates in returning to colonial slavery negroes who had made their way to England was based on an opinion given by York, attorney general, and Talbot, solicitor general, in 1729. In 1765 Blackstone himself gave a similar opinion. Lord Mansfield's decision in 1772 that slavery would not be tolerated in England was given by him with the greatest reluctance and only after the London juries had cried out in court "No property in men." The whole movement between 1810 and 1825 for the abolition of the death penalty for petty offenses was fought step by step by the judges and law officers of the crown. When all the other members of the ministry had agreed to Catholic emancipation, the attorney general and solicitor general still opposed and tried to defeat it. When a last struggle against the Reform Bill was determined upon it was to Lord Lyndhurst, one of the judges of the court of exchequer, that the king turned. This attitude of the courts and their officers is quite comprehensible. They were the guardians of the *status quo;* they stood primarily for the retention of things as they were. Efforts to make things as they should be,

as they might be, as reformers hoped they would be, even as the great body of the people were trying to make them, were antipathetic to the whole genius, training and function of the law courts. You will seek I believe in vain in history for any legal decision which has of itself carried human progress a step further, which of itself has abolished any old abuse, which of itself has lifted humanity to a higher plane. This statement is not intended to be derogatory to the courts. They have their usefulness and their proper function. They are necessarily conservative. It is right that they should enforce the law as it is until a higher power than they changes the law. They perform a valuable service to the community in defining and declaring existing law as well as in enforcing it. The community is in a better position to decide what they want the law in future to be after the judges have made clear what it is now. It is none the less true that the courts have been factors opposed to rather than helpful of progress; and that legal training and judicial experience, so far as can be judged from historical instances, have ill-fitted men to participate in the work of reform.

One more influence, and the last that need be mentioned here, tended to keep things as they were. No better name suggests itself for this than romanticism; an invincible tendency to see things, as soon as they are past, in a rosy light. We are apt to look on the past of mankind as we look on our own youth, with all its harsh lines obscured by the intervening haze, all its crude colors softened and harmonized by time and distance. This habit of looking at the past in a fanciful, imagined

light was responsible during the period of our study for one of the most common, though one of the most vulnerable, arguments against change: "it was good enough for our forefathers, therefore it is good enough for us." Such reasoning, fallacious as it was, helped to keep many a hoary abuse in existence long after it should in all decency have been removed. Sir Samuel Romilly proved with overwhelming wealth of example and inexorable rigor of argument, that the criminal code of his time was an ineffective device for reaching its intended object, an obsolete relic of a barbarous age. Yet he had to listen heart-sick in subsequent debate to arguments to the effect that these laws had been long on the statute book, that they represented the wisdom of the ancestors of that generation, and that they should not therefore be changed. This romantic and unreal view of the past, essentially incorrect as it almost always was, extended easily to that present which was so closely connected with the past, and made men cling to the conditions of their own time, just because they failed to look at them with clear and critical eyes.

Thus it would appear, if this survey of the social history of England a hundred years ago is correct, that ignorance, indifference and fear, the sanction of religion, the authority of law and the glamour of an unreal vision of things combined to weave around men a web that long held them fast in its meshes. These forces and influences tended to reduce society to an equilibrium, to prevent its progress, to keep it, with all its imperfections, all its crudities, all its injustice and oppression, all the results of its former mistakes and all its unful-

filled possibilities, in a state of arrested development. To this group of forces tending toward equilibrium we can give a name. It is "conservatism," the besetting sin of humanity. There is just one unpardonable sin that the race can commit; that is to "stand pat." There is just one absolutely fatal and hopeless condition into which mankind can fall; that is the inertia of stability.

The function of the agitator in history is now perhaps clear. The agitator is the man who destroys this equilibrium, who overcomes this inertia, who disturbs stagnation. He is the one who, striving to bring about some social or political advance, enlightens ignorance, stirs indifference, arouses courage, or in other ways lifts men from the dead level of willing acceptance of bad existing conditions.

Do not understand me to claim that cyclical changes have been the work of individual men. The laws according to which society develops are far too obscure to be explained in any such easy way; the massive sweep of the onward wave of progress is far too powerful to be set in motion by the strength or the thought of any one man. Nevertheless it seems to be a law of human society that the forces of progress are embodied in a man or a few men, that the scattered rays of enlightenment are concentrated and intensified by passing through the lens of a personality, that there must always be one or a few who do the work of suggestion, conversion, persuasion, incitement and guidance.

It was so when Mackintosh and Romilly strove for the reform of the penal code; it was so when Pitt and Peel and O'Connell carried the measure giving equal-

ity to the Roman Catholics; it was so when Clarkson and Wilberforce led in the movement for the abolition of the slave trade; it was so when Owen and Peel and Oastler and Ashley fought for the early factory acts; it was so with Howard and prison reform; it was so when Patrick Henry in Virginia and John Adams in Massachusetts and Benjamin Franklin in Pennsylvania were claiming for the people of the English colonies greater rights of self-government. It seems always to be so. You cannot trace the history of any great step forward in the acquisition of human right or justice without finding it necessary to name individual men. Everywhere in history individuals emerge as the personification of the forces which have brought about advancement. Apparently we never get ahead in any specific cause without the agitator. The way is doubtless being prepared in silence, but when the crisis has come, where there is actual change or progress he is a part of the matter.

He may be obnoxious to us,—he often is: he is apt to be a man of one idea. He may be brusque in his speech and manners; John the Baptist was. He may be extreme in his statements, unfair in his criticism, inaccurate in his facts, unjust in his inferences: all these were true of the early abolitionists. It may be remarked, however, that all these are often true of the conservative also. The appeals of the agitator may be directly opposed to the comfort and the conventions of the time. Why should they not be? He speaks for the future, not for the present. He embodies not contentment but the forces conducive to advancement. His function is often to tell us what we had rather not

hear, to interest us in what we do not want to think about. He suggests ideas that do not fall in with our habitual generalizations. He puts us to the pain of thinking. How we protest and deny and grow and broaden under the exaggerations and brutalities of Bernard Shaw or Anatole France! How two generations resisted and held back and struggled against the overwhelming influence of a Darwin. It may be the agitator's part to assure us that our darling fears are groundless, to encourage us to take risks that we had rather not run, to do or say what we are really afraid to. *Waffen nieder!* he cries; let us all disarm; let us be brave enough to trust one another. Or he may be some Roger Bacon, or Whitefield or George Fox or Thoreau or Walt Whitman or Robert Louis Stevenson who sets an example of nonconformity to the accepted mode of studying, of preaching, of living, of writing, or of dressing of the time, and forces us all into broader mindedness.

One passes readily from the social problems of the past to those of the present. The same conservatism exists, the same need to press forward in the work of reform, the same temptation to let things alone. The forests on many a New Hampshire or Pennsylvania or North Carolina or Oregon mountain-side are even now falling before the indiscriminate axe and saw of the lumbering companies, authorized by no higher right than private purchase of public possessions. A few years ago in our Eastern States we had wide stretches of unbroken noble forest, the possession and birthright of the whole people. We loaned them for a little while to the lumbermen, we received back a few million feet

of lumber, and now have only denuded, devastated, unsightly and unproductive stretches of country. Many a mountain stream in New England or Pennsylvania now pushes its encumbered way with diminished flow among stumps, slash and "poverty-birches" that might still be running with a full current under the arches, if not of the primeval forest, at least of trees of full size, strength and verdure. But we have given to private men the control of our American forests and streams that should belong to the community alone, and these possessions are daily wasting away before our eyes. Why do we allow this to occur? Is it not mere conservatism? Is there not the same ignorance of the facts: ignorance of the irreparable injury to the whole country; ignorance that private possession when applied to the natural resources of the nation is the crudest, most wasteful, most naïvely indefensible of all principles; ignorance that forests can be so managed that new timber will always be replacing the old and that we may each and all be richer by a change of policy? There is the same indifference, the fear of restricting private enterprise, even when it appears in this most wasteful of forms. There is the same need to overcome ignorance on this subject, to awaken interest, to arouse courage to preserve this our heritage. Wanted! An agitator! Not only a Pinchot, not only the protests and appeals of our schools of forestry, not only the quiet, steady scholarly pressure of many a good botanist, woodsman and nature lover; but a real living, troublesome, obnoxious agitator, who will not let us be comfortable until the work of saving our forests is accomplished.

Again, why is the problem of irregular employment allowed to remain unsettled? Every few years the tidal wave of unemployment sweeps over this and other countries. It is but a few years ago that eighty thousand persons were at one time unemployed in Pennsylvania. At other times for longer or shorter periods there have been fifty thousand. Why must these thousands of men and women, eager to work, use up their little savings, then tramp the streets day after day footsore, sick at heart, and yet unable in all this busy world to find a place to labor and earn a modest living? Irregularity of employment cries aloud for something to be done. It is the bane of industrial life, the most demoralizing element in our competitive society. Cannot the economists, the sociologists, the "captains of industry" suggest something to be done? Why must the working man, why must any man in this wealthy modern world live in constant dread of poverty? Why is the scale of wages for whole groups of working men so low that an accident, a spell of sickness, the loss of work for a few weeks submerges a man below the waves above which he has just been swimming? Irregularity of employment and inadequacy of wages in the lower ranks of labor call aloud for reform as much as did the old penal laws or the prisons or the destruction of the forests.

Why does such extreme inequality still continue? Why should a bread line be formed every winter on one street while there is a long line of automobiles standing before luxurious hotels, club houses and dwelling houses on another? The continuance of an inequality that allows to some less than their direst need while

others have more than the greatest profusion can utilize is perhaps the most fundamental and most insistent requirement for reform in the world. This condition continues to exist in this degree of intensity because conservatism exists. There are all the familiar phenomena. First, ignorance, colossal ignorance of the facts, and almost equal ignorance of those means of alleviating them that investigation, publication and experimentation are beginning to discover. Secondly, indifference. Certainly we have long been indifferent. Few people seem to care about these things. Twice, as it happens, I have watched West End London go about its usual interests and enjoyments while the faces of the dock strikers of the East End whitened and their spirits weakened to surrender under the sharp lash of starvation. The long, dark history of ill-treatment of the Indian by the government and the people of the United States would not have been nearly so dark and shameful if we had ever known or realized what we were doing.

To ignorance and indifference we must plead guilty. How about fear? Has every man bravely said what he thought about social questions, no matter what its effect on his personal fortunes or, what is still harder for some of us, no matter what his friends have thought of him? Do we not fear to take ameliorating steps which we already see plainly before us? Do we not fear to advocate or pass laws that may now or at some future time injure our personal interests? It is fear that prevents the enforcement of many laws already upon the statute book. We fear to experiment, when to leave things as they are is worse than any possible results of experimentation. We are like the navigators

of the Middle Ages who hugged the eastern shores of the Atlantic fearing unknown monsters in those western seas in which later explorers found only fertile islands and a rich new world.

If the continuance of irregularity of employment, low wages, inadequate compensation for accidents, child labor, bad housing, sordid living, poverty, are characteristic instances of conservatism, where is the agitator? He is not far to seek, though our ears may be deaf to his voice. You can find him in the dreamy visions of William Morris, or the hard reasonings of Karl Marx, or the thoughtful pamphlets of Prince Kropotkin, or the appeals to the working men of Lassalle and Louis Blanc and Tom Mann and August Bebel. You can find him in the scholarly writers of books like Jaurès or the Belgian socialist who has just visited this country, M. Vandervelde, or in the noisy soap-box orator who appeals to a little group on the street corner, when the policeman will let him. You can find him in the person of a quiet and refined woman like Jane Addams, or of the young enthusiast Tannenbaum, who insisted on going into a New York church to call the attention of the congregation to the needs of the unemployed, and as a result served a term in prison for disorderly conduct. You can find him in your own circle of friends and colleagues, in your favorite magazine, even, occasionally, in your daily newspaper. He varies all the way from the extreme radical to the advocate of progressive legislation. Whenever a man has a warm dissatisfaction with things as they are, is keenly alive to the desirability and possibility of change,

boldly speaks out what he thinks, and takes some active part in efforts for reform he is essentially an agitator. Do not understand me to say that these agitators have necessarily seen the light: that they are always wise and safe leaders. My only claim is that they are the precursors of progress. They are the men and women who will not let us sit down and accept things as they are. It is one of the most hopeful indications of advance in the field of social reform that the agitator in this field appears in so varied a guise. The inertia of settled social and economic conditions is great, the force required to overcome it must be correspondingly great.

What shall we say of war? Is war also a phenomenon of conservatism? Let us apply the same tests. Men divide themselves on this subject pretty clearly into two classes, those who consider war inevitable and those who do not. Is it not a fair statement that the first of these views involves the continued existence of the same qualities of ignorance, indifference, fear and conformity that we have found to mark other instances of the conservative attitude? Ignorance by one nation of the condition and ideals of another has been profound. There are few more complete delusions than popular opinion in one nation concerning the people of another. This ignorance of the true conditions of the time runs through all recent international relations. The people are ignorant of the actions of their governments. The governments are ignorant of the wishes of their people, quite apart from their ignorance of the best interests of these people. The diplomacy that allowed the nations in 1914 to be thrown in a few days, almost a few hours,

into hopeless conflict, now that that policy has been illuminated by the white light of war, proves to have been an ignorant and incompetent diplomacy.

Indifference concerning war has gone to the length of leaving matters of war and peace largely to the unsupervised control of the classes especially interested in war. The great mass of men went about their other business, leaving emperors and foreign ministers and military writers and manufacturers of war equipment to their game of playing with fire until a conflagration broke out. We have allowed those who accepted the dictum "In time of peace prepare for war," as if it were the only basis of international relations, to reiterate and act upon it, when a live interest in the matter would long ago have restated it, "In time of peace prepare that there shall be no war." How is it with fear? Many and diverse were doubtless the causes of this war. Some of them I suppose we shall know better in the future, some we shall probably never know. But running all through that tangled web is a thread of fear. In 1871, after Germany had taken Alsace and Lorraine from France, she feared a French war of revenge to regain them. It was this fear of France that led Germany to set the modern standard of military preparation. It was fear of attack on her food supply and her colonial communications by the German fleet that drove England to her extended naval policy of the years preceding 1914. It was fear that Germany would violate her treaty of neutrality that led Belgium and England into the negotiations of 1906 and 1911, the records of which have lately been so disingenuously explained by Germany and her favorers. It

was fear of the success of propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina that led Austria to make the provocative demand upon Servia which was the first step of the war. The German government early announced to the world that after Russia had mobilized she feared a sudden attack upon her, and that this precipitated her warlike action.

Ignorance on the part of the nations of one another's interests and ideals, indifference to efforts to avoid war, fear of the future, fear of one another, have been powerful supports of the habit of war. But these are the elements of conservatism. Conservatism has therefore done much to keep this old evil in existence, as it has so many other ancient ills. Yet it may pass away. These are not confirmed attitudes of mind. They have been altered in the past, they can be again. We may approach the problem of war more wisely, more interestedly, more bravely than we have done before.

We may call in another whole half of the human race, and in this respect a specially gifted half, to take part in our councils. The movement for women's suffrage cannot long be delayed, and it cannot but have a deep effect on the future of war. We may expect an application to the question of war of the strong common sense so generally applied by women to other questions in life, greater freedom from combativeness and a keener feeling for the value of life. The women will certainly help us to look on war differently, and may help us to bring it to an end.

In the search for the agitator who will break up our conservatism there can be discovered at least three classes of men who have urged the cessation of war.

In the first place there is the thoroughgoing pacifist, who believes that all war is forbidden or that it is always ineffective or unnecessary. Secondly, there is the socialist, who believes that the primary cause of modern war is the search by capitalists for markets for their goods or raw material for their manufacture or land or forests or mines for their private exploitation; that economic imperialism is in modern times the ultimate occasion for war, Thirdly, there is the believer in the possibility of a settlement of all international differences by non-warlike devices and negotiations, the restriction of armaments, delay in declarations of war, international courts of arbitration, the legal outlawry of war.

It is true that in these warlike days the pacifist has been coerced by power from without and weakened by primitive stirrings within; the socialist, like every one else in the warring countries, has been caught in the maelstrom of the present struggle of brute force; there is small comfort just now for the advocate of judicial settlement of international disputes—"*inter arma silent leges.*" Most of the mechanism of civilization has been for the time thrown out of gear. But protest has not been wanting. Many pacifists have refused to join the armies. One socialist leader, Jaurès, was stricken down in Paris on the very threshold of the war. Liebknecht in Germany has bravely reasserted his allegiance to the more permanent ideals of his party. There are those who hope that the war will soon be brought to an end by a negotiated peace, and we all know that "the mills of the gods grind slowly." Yet whether the aggressive opponent of war is a Philadelphia Quaker

or a French or German Socialist, or a canny Scotch iron-worker with his endowment of ten millions for the cause of peace, he is an agitator, a fighter against the inertia of conservatism, a stirrer up of the people, urging them to abolish one more ancient abuse, to leave war also behind us in the advance of man.

The twentieth century looks on the world with more wide-open eyes than the nineteenth. We are entering upon a heritage of new conceptions of the world as well as new opportunities in it. We have a growing faith that the old command, "replenish the earth and subdue it," means something more than merely to fill it with population, to increase the crops and to destroy its wild beasts. We have an increasing realization that man—all men—should be happy on the earth. We have a rising hope that many burdens that have weighed heavily upon men may be lifted from their necks. We must gird ourselves to the task. This means, among other things, that we must look on the agitator with more appreciation, with more effort to understand his message, with less readiness to trample him underfoot, with less disposition to condemn him unheard. For whether courteous, refined, moderate and sensible, or uncouth, fanatical, prejudiced, extreme, he represents what is apparently an indispensable factor in all social progress. The constant temptation of humanity is to sink into conservative inaction; the agitator, whether in the past or in the present, is the man who keeps us stirred to our work.

III

THE TIDE OF HISTORY

N October of the year 42 B. C. two armies lay facing one another on the plain of Philippi in the heart of Macedonia. One was the last hope of an old ideal of government, the Roman Republic, the other was the armed representative of a new era, that of military monarchy. The former was the army of Brutus and Cassius, the men who had stricken down great Cæsar rather than permit him to dominate Rome; the latter that of Anthony and Octavius, the avenger and the heir of Cæsar. The legions had been drawn from the furthest extent of Roman dominion to decide the great contest. For more than a year preparations had been made for this battle: proscriptions and confiscations throughout Italy, subjugations, forced contributions, and alliances in Greece, Asia Minor and Syria, had gone to provide the equipment and support that now brought the armies face to face. The future seemed about to be decided by a single contest; was Rome to be a republic or an empire? If Brutus and Cassius should win it would seem

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that Rome would continue a republic. If the two triumvirs should be victorious it would seem that the principle of monarchy would become the basis of Roman government, whether that monarchy were in the hands of three men or two or one. For more than three weeks the armies were stationary, awaiting the crisis, reluctant apparently to cast the dice on whose throw so much depended. But finally the battle of Philippi was fought; the army that represented the republic was defeated, the army that represented personal mastery at Rome was victorious; Brutus and Cassius found death on the battlefield, Anthony and Octavius divided the government of the Roman world between them. One battle, indeed one critical charge in that battle, had apparently settled the future. Rome was to be an empire.

But there was another question still to be settled by a battle; was the east or the west to dominate the Roman world? For one of the two victorious generals established himself in the east, in Greece, Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt; the other in the west, in Italy, Gaul, Spain and the Islands. When the time should come that one or other should become sole master of the Roman world which would it be? The east seemed the more likely to win. It was the ancient land of wealth, of craftsmanship, of culture, of refinement, of philosophy, of charm; the west represented rude vigor, semi-barbarous ambitions, warlike power, its foreign luxuries only such as were won by conquest, its wealth only gathered by plunder, its capacity of absorption and development still unknown. Anthony in the east, Octavius in the west represented this still unsettled conflict. The east had still more personal claims on the

future. A meeting at Tarsus and a winter spent in Egypt has linked for all time the name of Anthony with that of Cleopatra. The voluptuousness of the east glows in the very words with which the western poet describes their meeting.

"The barge she sat in, like a burnished throne,
Burnt on the water; the poop was beaten gold,
Purple the sails, and so perfumed that
The winds were lovesick with them: the oars were silver,
Which to the tune of flutes kept stroke and made
The water which they beat to follow faster,
As amorous of their strokes. For her own person
It beggar'd all description; she did lie
In her pavilion (cloth-of-gold of tissue)
O'er-picturing that Venus where we see
The fancy outwork nature: on each side of her
Stood pretty dimpled boys, like smiling Cupids,
With divers-colored fans whose winds did seem
To glow the delicate cheeks which they did cool
And what they undid, did."

Correctly or incorrectly the loves of the Egyptian queen and the Roman general have been introduced into history as one of its great guiding forces.

Ten years passed away after Philippi, and the east became continually stronger, and its prestige greater. Anthony's interests seemed to rest in the lands of the eastern Mediterranean. He entered upon campaigns in Parthia and Persia, he extended the dimensions of his empire to the eastward, he celebrated a triumph with all the Roman forces in Alexandria. The Roman proconsul was hidden in the robes of the eastern poten-

tate. He held brilliant Alexandrian ceremonies, where the children whom Cleopatra had borne to him were endowed with eastern provinces as a Persian king might have distributed his satrapies. A great silver platform was raised, where the joint rulers sat on golden thrones. Alexander, Cleopatra the younger and Ptolemy, as well as Cæsarion, Cleopatra's son by Julius Cæsar, sat with them while they were hailed by the titles "king of kings" and "queen of queens," and half worshipped as the incarnations of Osiris and Isis.

Finally the time came when the great triumvir had to turn away from this Asiatic pomp to the stern work of meeting the inevitable attack of his western colleague. Two armies again faced one another in battle, each now led by one of the victors of Philippi. As before the question of republic or monarchy, so now, it seemed, the question of the east or the west was to be settled. If Anthony won, the centre of Roman rule might well be transferred to Egypt; if Octavius were victor it would seem that the influence of the east would be checked and the Roman empire be dominated by the native genius of its western lands. Again the two forces lay for long weeks on the shores of the bay of Actium, as if their leaders already knew that the contest was to go down to fame as one of the critical battles of the world's history. At last the forces were joined; their fate hung in the balance during a long day, and according to contemporary story the decision was finally turned by the flight of the naval contingent of Cleopatra and the fatuous withdrawal of Anthony, choosing rather to follow the queen than the star of his still prosperous fortunes. Actium resulted in favor of Oc-

tavius. Anthony and Cleopatra lived out a few more months of hunted life, then they disappeared from the scene, and the power that had rested itself on the west became supreme throughout the whole Mediterranean world. Two battles within ten years seemed to have decided that Rome should be an empire and occidental.

The Roman empire had come and gone and long centuries had intervened, when on the 6th of March, 1429, a young peasant girl presented herself at the court of the Dauphin of France at Chinon, declaring that she brought a message from the king of heaven. She had a strange tale to tell of mysterious voices, angels with swords and saints with crowns who were her daily and nightly companions, and who had instructed her in her mission. She was to lead the armies of France to the relief of Orleans, to drive the English invaders from the realm, to bring back the duke of Burgundy to his allegiance, and to crown the Dauphin with the crown of his fathers. It would have been an easy thing to turn Joan of Arc away, to refuse to listen to such idle stories. Marvellous tales were on everybody's lips. In those troublous days old men were dreaming dreams and young men seeing visions through all of France. A poor knight who had seen a vision in Syria had come all the way home to prophesy peace for the comfort of the Dauphin. A woman, Marie Robine, had just had a vision in which she had been told to go to the prince and tell him which of the rival popes was the chosen of heaven. A Madame de Maille had lately proved her sanctity by turning her brutal husband into a lamb, had then taken up the life of a recluse and gave Delphic replies to all who came to her for advice. A shepherd

boy of the Gevaudan heard voices coming from the caverns on the side of the mountain which he recognized as those of angels, and on obeying the instructions they revealed to him was rewarded by the appearance of the blessed stigmata in his hands and feet like St. Francis. He also was brought to the court of the Dauphin. Catherine de la Rochelle, Brother Richard, two women from Brittany, all had supernatural experiences and all had their followers.

This girl of seventeen was ignorant; she could neither read nor write; she was not beautiful, she had no influence, she had no following, except a couple of men-at-arms sent two hundred miles across the country with her by a good-natured provincial captain. It was the merest chance that after a few days of waiting she obtained her interview with the Dauphin, put on her armor, raised her banner of the wounds of Christ and sent her message to the English. "King of England, and you, duke of Bedford, who call yourself regent of the realm of France, you William de la Pole, earl of Suffolk, John, Lord Talbot, and you Thomas, Lord Scales, who call yourselves lieutenants of the said duke of Bedford: do right to the king of heaven, deliver to the maid, who is sent here by God, the king of heaven, the keys of all the good towns which you have taken in France. She is come hither from God to restore the royal blood. She is ready to make peace if you are willing to do right to her, and on condition that you will quit France and pay back that which you have taken there. And you, archers, men of war, gentlemen and others who are before the city of Orleans, go away to your own country in God's name, and do not have confidence in God, the

king of heaven, son of blessed Mary, for you shall not have the realm of France, but God, the king of heaven, wills that King Charles the true heir shall have it, and the maid has revealed this to him."

Soldiers flocked to her side; in a few weeks inertia was overcome, the march on Orleans was begun, the siege which had lasted five months was raised after four days of attack and the English put to flight. The French discovered that they could still win battles, the Dauphin was aroused to enough energy to undertake the journey to Rheims, towns opened their gates, he was crowned in the cathedral where his forefathers had been crowned, and France was eventually regained for herself. To all seeming the appearance at court and the chance admission to the presence of the prince of an ignorant and superstitious peasant girl had saved the fortunes of a great monarchy and a great nation.

Was there so slight a proportion between the initiation and the conclusion of these series of events as a hasty description of them indicates? Let us return to the battlefield of Philippi. Did the question whether Rome should be a republic or an empire really rest on the outcome of that battle? Sixty years before this time Marius had been placed five times successively in the consulship in plain contravention of the republican constitution. During the whole intervening period the institutions of the old republic had been decaying; the seizure of concentrated power by single men or groups of men had become increasingly frequent. Sulla had been named perpetual dictator; it was seven years since Cæsar had crossed the Rubicon. The triumvirs who fought and won at Philippi were not the first triumvirs.

The brilliant genius of Ferrero, with the insight of the modern sociologist, has made abundantly clear what was already dimly seen by earlier students, that the old Roman republic as a form of government and society had already fallen, even before Brutus and Cassius struck down the greatest man at Rome; far more truly so before they made their last stand against his successors. A victory of the old republicans in this battle could only have been a temporary set-back in a great movement. If the two triumvirs had been defeated and killed some one else would surely have taken their place, and there would still have been an Augustus even if he had not been Caius Cæsar Octavianus. The battle of Philippi decided what one step in political change should be, it did not bring about that change. It cut the lease of life of Brutus and Cassius, it gave a short term of power to Anthony, a long term to Octavius, but it did not seriously affect the form of government of Rome.

Nor did the battle of Actium settle the question of the influence of the east over the west. Although the legions that were recruited and the fleet that was equipped in the east were defeated, although the wealth of the east was seized by the western victors, although Anthony fell on his sword and passed from the scene with his cry, "I am dying, Egypt, dying," on his lips, although the shackles of Roman rule were riveted more firmly upon Greece, Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt by the results of the battle, yet the silent, insistent, pervasive influence of eastern manners, culture, religion, art, ideas and habits continued as before to spread itself over the Roman world. There is scarcely a discern-

ible effect of the battle of Actium on the rapidity or the form of this process. The battle of Philippi was not really a critical battle, for the transformation of the republic into the empire had been accomplished without it; the battle of Actium was not a critical battle, because the change it seemed to frustrate occurred notwithstanding.

A similar doubt may be expressed of the crucial importance of the appearance of Joan of Arc on the scene. A careful examination into the condition of England and France in 1429 does more to explain the course of events than a study of the personality of the Maid of Orleans, interesting as that may be. The fortunes of the French national party were at their lowest ebb. The fighting spirit of the French soldiery and people was all but extinguished, the demoralization of the country was well-nigh complete. But the time for reaction had come. The cup had been drained to the dregs; it was now ready to be filled with new wine, new wine drawn from the never failing supplies of French patriotism, national self-confidence and hatred of the foreigner. And the foreigner himself was nearing the end of his powers of attack and capacity for subjugation. Expeditions fitted out in England for the invasion of France after the battle of Agincourt had to be provided with horse-shoes and horse-shoe nails and with forage for the horses for fear they should find none in the devastated fields and villages of France. The parliamentary grants were made with less willingness and less abundance than they had been of old. The alliances which England had formed on the Continent were held together with greater difficulty than formerly. A strong

peace party was growing up. All things were ready for a change. The peasant girl of Domrémy was the armed and inspired herald of this change. She did not turn aside the course of history, she but stood at the turning of the road and pointed out the way. The way then as now was the way of effort, unity, confidence, and this was in the people of France themselves.

If the great changes of history are so gradual, general and inevitable, what becomes of the free human spirit? Fatalism is repellent to the understanding, depressing to the will, deadening to progress. Have not men been free to choose their action in the past? Has the history of man been like the history of the rocks and the trees and the lower animals, its evolution the result merely of the reaction to outside influences of which they have known nothing and against which they were powerless? In answer to this we may ask, how is it with the individual man now? When we have counted up the influence on a man of heredity, of the social forces that surround him, of his education, of his opportunity, of the land and the age and the class and the occupation he lives in, we have counted up just so many limitations upon his unrestrained liberty of choice. It might seem that under these circumstances he must act and think and speak in a certain way. And yet we are persuaded that he has a residual amount of liberty of action. I have no intention of discussing human free will and determinism. I wish only to point out the analogy between history and the individual experience; because history is after all only the experience of the race.

Isolated events have not been absolutely without

their influence in history, individuals have not been entirely powerless over the course of events, though their influence has been relatively slight. Yet it is in this slight influence that their significance must be sought. Individuals have been able to bend, not to turn aside the line of change; but it is much that they have been able to bend it. Chance occurrences have had an effect in history, though not a great one, and it is upon this recognition that we must fall back for our estimate of the interest of casual events. In other words there are two things to consider in history, one the vast slowly changing, inevitable movements; the other the play of much lesser, more incidental, more personal, more chance occurrences. These may affect the form in which the changes come, they may perhaps hasten or retard them, they affect the details, but they are dependent upon and conditioned by the more fundamental, more irresistible movements of their time.

And yet it is in this field of the personal, the casual and the incidental that lies most of the heroic, the tragic, the pathetic in history. It is here that lie the lost causes and the hopeless struggles against an overmastering fate. It is here also that lie successful efforts to bring about reforms and to abolish human suffering. The great trend of events is beyond individual, perhaps beyond collective human control; to the lesser movements direction and character can be deliberately given. A martyr is a man who dies bearing witness to a cause which to him seems good but is for the time hopeless; his glory is bound up with the hopelessness of his cause; a hero is a man who exerts great efforts and makes great sacrifices for a cause which may or may not be

possible of success at the time, he is equally a hero whether he succeeds or fails; a wise and influential leader is one who by native genius or trained insight recognizes the trend of the events of his time and bends them in the direction he approves.

The martyrs will always be a "glorious company." No meed of praise will be denied to the hero who fell trying to do something which we can now see was under the conditions of his time impossible of accomplishment. Men's hearts will never cease to thrill at great deeds, whether they lead to success or failure. Indeed we have few means of judging what are the conditions of ultimate success or failure. The men who failed because they were ahead of their time may have been indispensable pioneers of the time when their plans ultimately became possible of fulfilment. The thrill in the heart of man at the story of heroic failure or pathetic loss may be necessary to prepare the hearts of men for further advance. More than a century ago a tender-hearted poet grieved that

> "Man's inhumanity to man makes countless thousands mourn,"

and it is still sadly true; but it is not so true as it was a century ago. As we look back on it that seems a hard and unsympathetic age. The quality of mercy has in some way and for some reason increased immensely in strength in our time, and there are now countless thousands who mourn over the unhappiness of their fellow beings to hundreds who felt such sympathy when Burns wrote. Sorrow over unnecessary suffering has become one of the great powers of the world in our

time and may yet triumph over its ancient enemies, neglect, injustice, poverty and war.

Let every man speak out and work out what is in him. But this does not preclude a recognition of the reign of law, and a thoughtful choice of the direction of effort. The greater part of the work of the world is done not by martyrs or by heroes, but by thoughtful men who are willing to ally themselves with the great controlling forces of their time. I do not say by men who will swim with the stream but by men who will take account of the force and direction of the current of the age in their swimming. The wise man is he who recognizes the strong currents of his own time and who acts in accordance with them. A realization that the larger movements of history are irresistible should make one reluctant to waste effort on something which cannot succeed. If we can only shape events, not control them, we should bend our energies to shaping them as we would have them, not to a futile and contentious opposition. A man who looking abroad at the universal extension of social control and co-operation in our time should set himself firmly against all regulation and association, and speak and act in favor of a rigorous individualism, may in the course of the compensating ages come to be looked back upon as a prophet of what is ultimately to be; but he will exert but little influence on this his own time. A man is none the less independent in action because he listens humbly and patiently for the deeper chords of the music of his own time and strives to make his efforts harmonize with them.

President Lincoln waited and waited while the members of his cabinet urged him to declare his policy, un-

til he was quite sure what the people of the United States wanted. President Wilson held back his recommendation that we enter the war till there was full reason to believe that such a recommendation would be supported by the general approval of the country. I am far from deprecating individual human effort, or belittling personal achievement. On the contrary the recognition that the limitations of action are so rigid and insuperable makes the story of personal striving all the finer. When once we have accepted the fact that far the greater part of history has been an irresistible progress, but slightly influenced by individual men, and changed only in detail by exceptional events, we have all the interest of what is peculiar and original concentrated in the small part of history which is explicable by single occurrences and individual personalities. We may explore at the same time the two realms of history, the one and far the greater part that of the fundamental underlying conditions, cyclical changes, irresistible movements; the other that of the personal and exceptional. The former makes more appeal to the intellect, the latter to the emotions; the former is impressive, often sublime; the latter is picturesque, often tragic, exciting, sad, amusing, or grotesque. The former shares the character of the immutable laws of physical nature, the latter has all the attraction of the apparently free action of the human will. It is because of these appealing qualities that we habitually disregard the full extent of that which has been irresistible in history, and persistently overestimate the extent of that which has been subject to the control of chance or of human effort. The fact remains that vastly the

greater part of that which has occurred has been subject to the larger laws, much less has been fortuitous or voluntary.

To obtain a statement of the true doctrine, let us go back once again to the battle-field of Philippi, looking on it for the moment as it is portrayed in "Julius Cæsar." In the third scene of the fourth act of the play Brutus and Cassius are talking in the tent of Brutus. The philosophic Roman observes to his more soldierly companion

"There is a tide in the affairs of men . . ."

I am not now concerned with the completion of the quotation or with the context. I had rather think of the great dramatist pausing a moment in the flow of his creative composition to ponder on the significance of the great generalization he had made; that the affairs of men, the events of history, are not detached, separate, unconnected facts and occurrences but are so closely combined into a great indivisible whole, so united, intermingled and interrelated, so continuous and so homogeneous, that it is natural to think of them under the similitude of the tide. Brutus and Cassius were not creators of history, whose discussions and actions, whose failure or success would have much significance; but rather part of a tide of human affairs, a rising tide which would carry them both to death and submergence on the morrow, which would sweep away the republic and bear in the empire, which would destroy the city of brick and bring in the city of marble, which would carry the boundaries of the empire far to

the South and East and North and West, which would disperse through that vast territory Roman law and institutions, and send its waves spreading on through all subsequent time.

So it was with the poor little maid of Orleans, with her unfaltering faith in her mission, her angels and her saints. She was but part of a wave that carried her and her Dauphin and the fortunes of France on to the relief of Orleans, the coronation at Rheims, the capture of Paris, the reconquest of the fatherland. It is true that Joan herself was tossed aside by the tide to the capture at Compiègne, the trial in the chapter house of Rouen, the stake in the market place and the ashes on the waters of the Seine. Yet the same tide bore her memory aloft on a later wave, no longer a neglected and disregarded sacrifice, but a heroine and a saint, the embodiment of the patriotism, the self-sacrifice, the realization of the value of immaterial things that are the best qualities of the French character. Now there is scarcely a spot on which Joan of Arc set her foot that has not a monument to her. In the humble room where she is said to have been born at Domrémy, at the entrance to the castle where she presented herself to the Dauphin at Chinon, on the bridge that she crossed into Orleans, in the city square of Rheims, in the market place where she suffered at Rouen, on a crag on the hills outside of that city where her figure now looks down over the broad valley of the Seine, in the centre of one of the proudest streets of Paris, in provincial towns and foreign cities. One of the most famous of French painters has depicted the scenes of her life on the walls

of the Pantheon; one of the most learned of French historians has gathered all the documents concerning her life in four stately volumes; a library of learned works has grown up to throw light on her life and character and surroundings; a whole series of dramas and poems and romances have made her their subject. One of the very few questions on which Clerical and Liberal in France can agree is in honoring her memory; her name-day every year is celebrated with processions and services, and a few years ago St. Peter's at Rome was the centre of prolonged brilliant and imposing ceremonies in connection with her beatification. She has become a national ideal.

"The land was broken in despair,
The princes quarreled in the dark
When clear and tranquil, through the troubled air
Of selfish minds and wills that did not dare
Your star arose, Jeanne d'Arc.

O virgin breast with lilies white—
O sun-browned hand that bore the lance,
You taught the prayer that helps men to unite,
You brought the courage equal to the fight.
You gave a heart to France!
. . . . . .

And now again the times are ill,
And doubtful leaders miss the mark
The people lack the single faith and will
To make them one, your country needs you still—
Come back again, Jeanne d'Arc!

O woman-star, arise once more
And shine to bid your land advance:

The old heroic trust in God restore,
Renew the brave, unselfish hopes of yore,
And give a heart to France."

The French peasant girl who by chance secured an interview with the Dauphin has indeed been carried far on the tide of history.

So events trivial in themselves are raised to heroic proportions by their position in the development of great movements. It is this largeness of history, the significance of small events because they are parts of a greater whole that has always made this subject a favorite study of thoughtful minds. One can scarcely find an occurrence in history so slight, so isolated that it does not connect itself closely and naturally with others of the greatest interest and importance. On the 19th of April, 1775, in the village of Lexington, a conflict broke out between a few files of British soldiers and some Massachusetts farmers and workmen. To the British ministers and people it might well seem a casual instance of colonial turbulence; even to Americans of that day it scarcely differed from other instances of resistance to unjustifiable interference. But in history it stands as a great landmark, the beginning of the American Revolution, with all its meaning for America, for England and the world. At noon on the first of November, 1517, Dr. Martin Luther tacked up on the door of the castle church of Wittenberg a statement of ninety-five principles or heads concerning indulgences which he was prepared to discuss. It would not seem a very important matter for a theological professor to offer to debate openly on a well known subject of con-

troversy; it was a familiar practice. Yet this incident is one of the best known occurrences in history, for as we watch the ninety-five theses being placed on the church door we are standing on the threshold of the Reformation.

There is something peculiarly expanding to the mind in this sweep of the tide of history. Any one man's experience is after all limited in time and space. Life is short; its occurrences are relatively few; they are much detached, or held together only by the slender thread of our own personality. But in history we follow long series of events, we trace clearly connected lines of cause and effect, we perceive complicated interrelations. There gradually grows up in us the sense of the continuity of things, we realize the world as "*immer werdend*," we come to feel in all its intensity that "there is a tide in the affairs of men." To a person who watches the mysterious throbbing of this pulse of the seas there may come a sense of depression as he sees the waters recede, laying bare rocks and bars, making the channels smaller, taking away much that is useful, disclosing much that is unsightly. But this is only the ebbing tide, soon to flow back again in all its fullness. That is why historians are cheerful, hopeful people. An observer of the events of the past has seen so many changes that were not catastrophies and heard so many fears expressed that have not been justified. He has listened to so many prophecies of disaster and has seen them fail of fulfilment; he has counted up so many losses compensated by greater gains; he has learned that so few injuries have proved in the long run irreparable, that he comes to watch for the flow as well as the ebb of the

tide. The historian Henry C. Lea after eighty years of life and studies that had familiarized him with the conditions and events and thoughts of many centuries declared that it was one of the most profound of his convictions that the world was growing better and happier. Human life is on the whole a rising tide.

We may not know what distant planets control the tide of history. Now and then in our more sanguine moods we may think we get glimpses of the universal laws to which its ebb and flow are obedient. We may see for example that no very sudden and complete change can or at least does take place in human history. If such are attempted they prove to be futile. For instance, in 1649 the English House of Commons executed the king, abolished the monarchy and the House of Lords and organized the Commonwealth, with a single house of parliament and a large council to act as the administrative body. That is to say, a nation which had been under a strong monarchy for a thousand years and more was suddenly transformed into a republic with a weak executive. Note what happened. Within four years a single elective head for the administrative department was chosen; then he was given the old royal palace of Whitehall as a dwelling place; soon his position was given him for life with power to appoint a successor; then a second house was organized. When documents came to be headed with the formula "We, Oliver, Protector," and all legislative measures had to pass through two houses and then to be accepted by one executive head, it made little difference that they were signed *Oliverius Protector* instead of *Carolus Rex.* It was obvious that the parliamentary leaders had

attempted a greater political change than England could conform itself to, and England was soon again a monarchy. So in the time of the French Revolution, the enthusiastic republicans of 1791 and 1792 abolished the old monarchy, the old aristocracy, the old church; but within twenty years they had all crept back. The Convention yielded to the Directory, the Directory to the Consulate, Bonaparte became First Consul for ten years, then for life, then Emperor. Surrounded by his new military and official nobility and strengthened by the concordat with the pope he was giving proof anew, notwithstanding his autocratic sway, of the powerlessness of a man or a group of men to change very deeply or suddenly the needs and habitudes and institutions of many men.

This is perhaps but another way of saying that evolution controls human society as it does organic nature. The processes of adjustment and modification are constant and gradual, not sudden or cataclysmic. The attempted introduction by the mere will of man of a condition or requirement quite out of line with other conditions existent at the time is either absolutely ineffective or is rapidly transformed to accommodate itself to them. Not that things remain unchanged by the entrance of a new factor. This is again another, albeit a somewhat negative historical law. Things are never the same again. History never repeats itself. There may be a certain superficial similarity to former conditions, a distant analogy that catches the fancy of the speculative mind; but the similarity will never bear close inspection. The seventeenth century was a period of government regulation of industry, the twentieth

century bids fair to be a period of government regulation of industry; but history has not repeated itself. In the earlier period this regulation was enforced by an absolute monarchy and largely in the interests of that monarchy or of certain favored classes; regulation in the later period is carried out by a democracy and principally in the interests of the mass of people. One characteristic of the two periods is alike, many others are different. The close of the eighteenth century was a period of much freedom of thought and of speculation and divergent views of the universe. The close of the nineteenth century has likewise seen much freedom of thought and speculation, but in the meantime the great generalization of evolution had been made and thought could never again follow its old lines.

It has to some seemed a law of history that society is always dominated and the actions of men controlled by economic conditions, economic needs, economic motives, that master and slave, lord and serf, employer and employee have been the underlying categories of men. They think they have discovered that men's actions, thoughts and ideals all arise from the way they make their living, that religion, law, science, government, progress are all but functions of economic life. This historical law, laid down by Karl Marx, has been widely but uncritically accepted as a clue to all history. It would be a great boon to mankind to have this law more carefully investigated and if it proved untenable to remove temptation from those who are now striving to obtain power in order to apply it to practical life.

But in our more sober moods we must doubt whether we have yet reached the time for the discovery of the

laws of history. It is comparatively easy to discover physical laws. All the phenomena of nature are around us all the time. The stars move in their courses every night, the birds and animals reproduce and return every spring time, the tide rises and falls twice in every twenty-four hours, even the fossil lower organisms exist in sufficient number and fixity of shape to make possible generalized statements and to formulate laws of growth or relationship.

But the phenomena of man, of human society, of history are far harder to discover, to correlate, to make inferences from. Even the physical traces of man in his earlier stages are surprisingly and disappointingly few. It seems almost as if some malevolent fate had striven to hide from him the materials from which alone he can discover his early parentage. Part of a skull found in the sandhills of Java, a jawbone in a cave in Belgium, a few parts of skeletons in France and Spain, some bones in a clay bed in England, these and such as these are the few remains of the frame of man in his stages just preceding the present age. Evidences of his early culture are only slightly more numerous. Spirited drawings in a few caves and on some scattered bones, burial mounds and their contents, implements, ornaments, weapons and a few early structures testify to his primitive occupations and mental powers. Even when we reach the period of written documents we are still narrowly limited. The "lost books of Livy," the "destruction of the Alexandrian library," neglect, decay, deliberate or careless destruction, such are familiar expressions that we must use concerning the preservation of the records of the past. We are now painfully

gathering together the fragments that the tooth of time has not entirely destroyed. What a thing of rags and patches is history! We see a mass of ruined walls on a now deserted plain, and know not who built them or what kind of life they lived; we find and interpret a few score or hundreds of documents where thousands and hundreds of thousands have gone to destruction. We know only yesterday and part of the day before out of the hundreds of thousands of years of man's life on the earth.

We are not ready to interpret such records as we do possess. They are largely still on tablets, in manuscripts, often inaccessible except to a very few, illegible, inedited. What sort of material is this from which to construct the laws of history? Moreover our judgment on past history needs clarification. We are only gradually divesting ourselves of long-held prejudices that prevent us from seeing our own past clearly and in proper perspective. We have only gradually come to see that the history of the daily life of the people is equal in dignity to that concerning kings, governments, churches, wars and diplomatic negotiations. Yet it is this above all which promises some insight into the laws that govern history. Some time, when we have gathered together all than can be found of human records to as remote a period as they can be found, when we have reduced these to an easily comprehensible form, when we have learned to look at them with unprejudiced eyes, when individual points have been made clear by careful study, when the fundamental and the casual, the typical and the anomalous, the inevitable and that which is subject to personal influence have all been satisfactorily

discriminated, then perhaps,—if we know enough psychology and sociology,—we may be able to formulate the laws that have governed the course of history.

In the meantime we must make specific decisions; in our personal actions we must take life as it is. No thoughtful man can look out on our own time and not be impressed, if he is not overawed, by the majestic flow of the currents of change, economic power and scientific advance; democracy, its great work in the political field largely done, extending into the domain of industrial and social reorganization; the state, the lethargy of the nineteenth century thrown off, rising in all the energy and confidence of renewed youth to undertake tasks the most arduous and varied and extensive; the community as a whole through its various agencies taking into its service all that science has acquired and art produced and utilizing these results for its collective ends; men and women in constantly increasing numbers turning from a narrow and sterile individualism and adding to their personal ambitions an intelligent and altruistic interest in the higher good of the great mass of mankind. It may require faith to believe that these are all tendencies for good; but whether they fall in with our predilections or not, they are here. It is among these surroundings that we of the present generation live and shall continue to live. History goes forward not backward. It is in conformity with these tendencies that we must work if we work efficiently at all. In the present as in the past, the great historic forces are all-powerful; our efforts are only effective in so far as they fall in with them. Not only is it true that

"There is a tide in the affairs of men . . ."

but, continuing the speech of Brutus,

"On such a full sea are we now afloat,
And we must take the current when it serves
Or lose our venture."

IV

HISTORICAL TESTS OF DEMOCRACY

HAT democracy is the best form of government is not a self-evident proposition. A form of government in which the learned and the ignorant, the thrifty and the unthrifty, the experienced and the inexperienced, may all, so far as their votes go, exercise the same influence over the course of political events seems to need especially strong defense. It is, moreover, comparatively new doctrine. A great many of the most thoughtful writers and statesmen have doubted the wisdom and practicability of democracy as a form of government. English Liberals have claimed that England has a representative, not a democratic type of government. Even now it is probable that our unanimity of support of democracy is one of the many hastily formed generalizations of the war. All over the world, in America, in Europe and in the East, many men are beginning to hesitate, to express doubts whether this was a war for democracy, and are advocating lines of policy that are inconsistent with a belief that the people should be allowed to choose

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their own form of government and decide on their own political action. And yet it would seem there should be some way in which the value of democracy as compared with other forms of government could be tested. As a student of history I naturally turn to history for a possible solution. If we can find three periods in the history of some one country, in which the three principal forms of government, autocracy, aristocracy and democracy, have existed, respectively, and then see in which period that country was best governed, we ought to be able to reach a more satisfactory basis of belief than mere custom.

If the first few years of the seventeenth century in England be compared with the first few years of the nineteenth century in the same country, and these again with the corresponding number of years of the twentieth which have just been completed, we shall have three periods in the history of one country which were alike in many respects, but in which the spirit of the government was strongly contrasted. The first was characterized by an autocratic form of government, the second by an aristocratic or oligarchical form, the third by as nearly a democratic spirit, probably, as the world has yet known. The period from 1600 to 1618 covered the last years of the reign of Queen Elizabeth and the first fifteen years of James I; the period from 1800 to 1818 covered the last years of the rational life of George III and the first years of the administration of his son George IV; the period from 1900 to 1918 covers the reign of Edward VII and what it may be hoped is but the early part of the reign of his present majesty, George V. The three periods were, as has been

said, in many ways alike. Each was free from the personal equation of a single sovereign; each saw both peace and war; each included a crisis in the relations between England and her principal dependency, Ireland; each was a period of great achievement, and of each we have a vast amount of familiar knowledge.

As to form of government, during the first period the last of the Tudors and the first of the Stuarts ruled as almost absolute monarchs. They appointed such ministers as they preferred, they called parliaments when they chose, controlled much of their action and dismissed them when they saw fit. They made war and peace with only the slightest of reference to the wishes of their subjects, and exercised wide and minute control over both civil and ecclesiastical affairs. The government of England could then fairly be called, according to the expression with which we are now so familiar, an autocratic government.

In the second period, 1800 to 1818, England was still, it is true, a monarchy in form, but a monarchy in which the powers of the king were so restricted that the centre of gravity of government must be sought for not in the crown but in parliament. Parliament now met every year, exercised entire control over its own actions, sat as long as it saw fit and discontinued its sittings when it wished. The ministers were not in any proper sense appointees of the king. They were the leading men of the party that had a majority in parliament, and they carried on all the affairs of government subject to the control of parliament. Parliament was the ruler of England. But who was back of parliament? Whom did parliament really represent? About 100,000 or possibly

200,000 men making up the "governing classes" of England. From among these came all members of parliament and effective voters, all holders of office, all ambassadors to foreign countries, all judges and county magistrates, all officers in the army and navy. From the same group were drawn the clergy of the established church. The two universities and the great public schools existed for their training and advantage. They were the landowners of England, a *Junker* class, to use another modern term. They and not either the king or the mass of the people ruled England. It is therefore sufficiently accurate to say that England at the beginning of the nineteenth century had an aristocratic form of government. It was an oligarchy, in which about one-fiftieth of the population or one-tenth of the grown men alone exercised the powers and duties and shared the special privileges and advantages of government.

The century that has elapsed since 1818 has seen a wonderful series of political changes. The bulwarks of aristocracy have yielded and yielded again to the oncoming waves of liberalism, until parliament today speaks practically for the whole nation. Undeveloped and crude as this system still is, it may fairly be said that England is a democracy. At the election which took place three months ago the merchant, the country gentleman, the professional man, the peasant on the land, the artisan in the factory, the clerk at the desk, the miner and the transportation worker had an equal share with all other classes of the community in declaring what policy they wanted to have followed and to what men they would entrust the carrying out of their

will. The conservatism of the ages yielded at last to the arguments for the equal interest of men and women in the state, and the previously unenfranchised half of the race was given an opportunity to express itself. No one deposited more than one vote, and yet every man and woman in England practically had an opportunity to deposit that vote.

Thus we have three reasonably clear-cut periods in the history of the same nation, each period representing one type of government. To repeat, from 1600 to 1618 England was under an autocratic government, from 1800 to 1818 it was under an aristocratic government, from 1900 to 1918 it was under a democratic government. It ought to be possible to compare these and see which has given the best results. Under which form of government has England been ruled most wisely? I want to apply five tests successively to each of these periods, a financial test, a military test, the test of wisdom in dealing with dependencies, the test of favor to learning and literature, the test of humane feeling. Examining as impartially and critically as possible from each of these points of view the period of absolute government, the period of aristocratic government, and the period of democratic government, which can give the best account of itself?

Every government must collect and spend money. It must provide for the cost of its own existence, and as a matter of fact it chooses certain objects which demand expenditure and gathers in and pays out the money necessary for these purposes. This is in all times a very practical and natural function of government. The most characteristic mark of the financiering of the

time of Elizabeth and James I, our first period, was its personal character. The taxes were looked upon, collected and spent as part of the personal income and expenditure of the ruler. The result was a most inadequate and inefficient taxation. Neither the queen nor James dared risk their precarious popularity with the influential classes of the people by a rigorous assessment. Noblemen and country gentlemen who were in a position to spend many hundred pounds a year were reported in the taxation lists as having an income of ten pounds, twenty pounds or fifty pounds. Collections were spread over several years when the government had need for the full amount immediately; and England, although wealthy, had but a small sum to spend on national objects. During this period it amounted to about ten million dollars a year in modern values. It is seldom less than a billion dollars now, even in times of peace. The population of modern England is about eight times as great as at the death of Elizabeth, but the income of government is from one to four hundred times as great. Of course, the periods should be compared on the basis of their relative wealth not on the basis of the number of people. Nevertheless the discrepancy is striking. Autocratic taxation was inefficient taxation.

In the expenditure of this income there was the same personal character. Elizabeth lavished much of the national wealth that came into her hands on her dress, her table or her favorites, while she doomed important military and naval expeditions to certain failure by withholding their necessary cost. For many years the personal and household expenses of one old lady, albeit the

queen, amounted to about one-tenth of the whole of the government's expenditure. This is a very different matter from the cost of the comparatively simple and cozy meals at which King George and Queen Mary have lately been entertaining Mr. and Mrs. Wilson.

James had a somewhat larger income to spend for the purpose of government than Elizabeth, but he spent it even more capriciously. He could never say no to a personal friend who asked for money; he was therefore seldom in a position to say yes when his ministers recommended to him any important object for which government expenditure should have been made. The financial wisdom of the absolute government of this period is not such as to rouse admiration in the mind of the critical investigator.

In the second of our periods, taxation and the expenditure of the money collected were, like all the other work of government, under the control of parliament. Neither George III nor George IV was seriously consulted on financial affairs. Such matters were debated at great length in parliament and decided upon by majority vote of that body. If the record of these debates can be trusted to testify to the wisdom or unwisdom of the system of taxation in the early nineteenth century, no system was ever more unsatisfactory to those who were responsible for and to those who suffered under it. The most unbounded criticism was expressed by opponents of the ministers, while their defense was extremely languid. Most taxes were both proposed and accepted reluctantly and only because no one would suggest a less objectionable form. In the next to the last year of the period Brougham in a

brilliant and bitter speech attributed most of the calamities of the time to the bad system of taxation. Notwithstanding these heavy, varied and unpopular taxes, Napoleon was able to comfort himself in his loneliness on the island of Elba in 1814 with the reflection that he had left in the vitals of England what he called "the poisoned dart" of a war debt of four billion dollars. It is a curious observation that the only financial device that obtained almost universal approval through the greater part of the period, Pitt's sinking fund, was acknowledged in its last year to have been a delusion,—simply a means of paying off debt by borrowing more money and creating new debt. Larger sums of money were raised by taxation and by loans in the nineteenth century than in the seventeenth century. In each of the last years of the war against Napoleon more than the value of a billion dollars was raised. Beyond this but little praise can be given to the aristocratic governing classes of England as financiers.

In the Edinburgh Review, in the year 1818, Sydney Smith gave a résumé of British taxation in the form of advice to the United States: "We can inform Jonathan what are the inevitable consequences of being too fond of glory: TAXES upon every article which enters the mouth, or covers the back, or is placed under the foot, taxes upon everything which is pleasant to see, hear, feel, smell, or taste, taxes upon warmth, light, locomotion, taxes upon everything on earth and the waters under the earth, on everything that comes from abroad, or is grown at home, taxes on the raw material, taxes on every fresh value that is added to it by the industry of man, taxes on the sauce which pampers

man's appetite and the drug that restores him to health, on the ermine which decorates the judge and the rope which hangs the criminal, on the poor man's salt, and the rich man's spice, on the brass nails of the coffin and the ribands of the bride. At bed or board, couchant or levant, we must pay. The dying Englishman pouring his medicine, which has paid seven per cent, into a spoon that has paid fifteen per cent, flings himself upon his chintz bed, which has paid twenty-two per cent, and expires in the arms of an apothecary who has paid a license of a hundred pounds for the privilege of putting him to death. His whole property is then immediately taxed from two to ten per cent, his virtues are handed down to posterity on taxed marble, and he is then gathered to his fathers, to be taxed no more."

An Irishman of the time is said to have written upon his assessment paper: "Take notice, I have cut the throats of all my horses, I have shot all my dogs, I have burned all my carriages, I have dismissed all my servants except my wife, and therefore I conceive that I cannot be liable to any assessment whatever."

If we turn to the uses to which the taxes were put, apart from the expenditure for war, which was common to all three periods, there was not so great a difference between the first and the second periods as might be expected. The personal grants were perhaps based on more real claims; but the long lists published in the "Black Book" of 1830, of sinecurists, wives of courtiers, retired ministers and shelved politicians, testify to as much favoritism as that found in the time of Elizabeth or James, if somewhat more diffused. In-

numerable private grants, special favors and bribes were given by successive ministers to those whose help they needed or whose previous support they felt bound to reward. The royal family was expensive. In 1818 the amount paid by parliament to the king and his relatives for their private expenses amounted to seven and a half million dollars of our money. Nations are always generous, and not improperly so, to their successful naval and military leaders; but that Nelson's brother should have been made an earl with a grant of $30,000 a year, each of his sisters given $50,000, and a half-million dollars paid for an estate to be used by his family, seems a disproportionately liberal use by parliament of the people's money, even to show their appreciation of a great naval victory. A million dollars was appropriated to buy a palace for the Duke of Wellington in a year when great numbers of the English people were starving and when taxation was a crushing weight to hundreds of thousands of others.

If we compare with the taxes of the two earlier periods those which are characteristic of the present period, and especially those which were introduced in 1909 by Chancellor of the Exchequer Lloyd George, several things are noticeable. In the first place, the war taxes have been little more than a continuance, and of course a vast increase, of those previously imposed. That is to say, the taxing power in time of peace has approximated to that which is possessed by the government in time of war. Then it will be observed that impatience of taxation is much less. The modern Englishman probably does not like to pay taxes any more than his predecessor, but he knows that he is now

doing it for himself. He has accepted it as his share of the price of well-being. There is a strong inclination to introduce ethical ideas into taxation. If landed property becomes more valuable as a result of the growth of the whole community, as distinct from any action on the part of the individual owner, the so-called unearned increment, this increase, or a part of it, is taken by the government through taxation, and spent for the general uses of the whole community. If a man by reason of suddenly increased opportunities such as those of war, is in a position to obtain very great profits, much of this excess is taken for national uses through taxation. At the present time in England in various ways something over eighty per cent of the income which is derived from special advantages is taken by taxation, and there is little probability that these taxes will cease with the close of the war. Similarly, those who are especially unfavorably placed in society are deliberately favored by exemptions. Long before the war had come and intensified the rate of progress of all changes, it was clearly evident that taxation had come to be looked upon partly as a means of redressing unjustifiable inequalities of fortune. Modern taxation is at the same time far less burdensome and far more fair in the human sacrifices it imposes than that of either of the former periods.

Then there is the wonderful efficiency of taxation in recent times. Over and over again in these last few years it has seemed that the limit of power or of willingness of the people to contribute to the expenses of the government had been reached, but still greater sacrifices have been called for and have been made, with

equal cheerfulness, till more than ten billions have been collected and spent during this last year. Certainly democracy as a money-getter has shown resources and power far beyond those of either autocracy or oligarchy.

Compare for a moment the objects of expenditure of modern government with those of the two earlier periods, omitting again the one great object of war, which is common to all three. The support of education, the provision of national libraries and art galleries, the encouragement of agriculture, old age pensions, national insurance, the cost of labor exchanges, scientific research, the publication of historical records,—for no one of these enlightened purposes was a single shilling expended by the government in the seventeenth or the early nineteenth century, while they have all been provided for by substantial sums in the twentieth. Is there any doubt that in the domain of finance, perhaps the most concrete of tests, democratic government has shown itself more effective, more just and more enlightened than either autocratic or aristocratic government?

Let us turn to another fundamental test, that of war. It is true that history never exactly repeats itself, but those who are interested in the analogies that simulate repetition will note the many parallelisms of war in each period. In each, England claimed to be opposing a would-be world conquerer; in the time of Elizabeth, Philip of Spain; in the early nineteenth century, Napoleon; and in the twentieth, Kaiser Wilhelm. In each of the periods along with the general determination to carry on the war there was a pacifist party,

advocating negotiation instead of war. Elizabeth, writing to her ally, Henry IV, declares that her people are constantly coming to her protesting against the continuance of the war with Spain, and a well-known scene has come down to us where old Burghley advocating peace in the privy council opened a Bible at the passage, "The bloody and deceitful man will not live out half his days," and handed it to the Earl of Essex who was urging continuance of the war. At the beginning of the second period, in 1800, cities, counties and towns were petitioning the government to bring the war with France to an end. Near its close, in 1814, when Napoleon returned from Elba and again defied Europe, Whitbread, a prominent Whig statesman, obtained a vote of seventy-two in parliament against renewing the war. In 1816 the city council of London speaks of the misfortunes of the country as "the natural effect of rash and useless wars, unjustly commenced and pertinaciously persisted in, where no rational object was to be attained." The pacifist party in the present war is a matter of too recent knowledge to need special attention. Conscription was used for the army in the first and third periods, for the navy in all three. Although a formal draft was not used for the army in the Napoleonic wars there was much informal compulsion used in recruiting even the small armies which England then sent to the continent.

Has democracy proved to be less inclined to war than autocracy or oligarchy? From this particular investigation it is hard to give an answer. Each period has seen war. Certainly the guilt of the initiation of the great war which has just closed does not lie at the

door of democratic England. She accepted it when it came, she did not seek it. Certainly there has been a higher idealism running through the motives of this war than was true of the wars of either of the earlier periods. There has been little talk of military glory, of conquest; even national condemnation and hatreds have been less than of old. Certainly the removal of autocracy from the world removes some of the favoring causes of war. The most that can be said, perhaps, and it is saying a great deal, is that democracy furnishes the most favorable soil in which to cultivate the tender plant of peace. Democracy itself does not guarantee peace, but human effort and thought under the conditions of democracy have a fairer field in which to bring about peace than under either of the earlier forms of government.

But granted that war has come, which form of government has carried it on most energetically and effectively? Until four years ago there might have been doubt. Now there is none. I suppose that never in the history of the world has there been a greater exhibition of vigor, concentration of effort, sustained courage and efficient military achievement than that which democratic England has displayed in building up and putting into service in the short space of three years her great war machine. Or if England has any rival it is another democracy which had still less of technical preparation for war, and armed herself still more rapidly. Compared with these achievements the vacillating military efforts of the government of Queen Elizabeth and the series of mistakes and failures of nineteenth century aristocracy, at least in land warfare,

redeemed though it was at last by one great victory, which characterized the war against Napoleon, are but primitive anticipations of real warfare.

It has of course been said that democratic England in 1915 achieved military efficiency by becoming for the time an autocracy. This is not true. The ministry could have been removed from office at any time during the war by the simple expedient of an adverse vote in parliament, and this was not given. The difference between autocracy and democracy does not lie in the degree of power of the state over the individual. That may be the same in both, or be even greater in a democracy. There have probably never in history been more complete suppressions of individual freedom of action than in the British defense of the realm and conscription acts and in our espionage and selective service acts. And yet they were passed deliberately by the representatives of the people and apparently with the hearty approval of the great mass of the people. They were therefore democratic laws, although they were extreme assertions of the supremacy of the state. Autocracy gives to one individual, democracy gives to the whole community the power of the state, but the power of the state is not necessarily diminished. No, the simple fact is that democracy develops a surplus of energy, wealth and initiative spirit that can be as rapidly directed to the uses of war as to any other uses. England was better prepared for the great encounter by her development of democracy than she would have been by forty years of military drilling and technical preparedness. Tested by war as by finance democracy compares more

than favorably with either preceding form of government.

Now turn to the test of England's treatment of dependencies, or, as a type, of her principal dependency, Ireland. Ireland has, as I have said, gone through a crisis in each of these periods. How has the English government met it? In the first years of the seventeenth century she met it by conquest. At the dawn of our period, at the close of the sixteenth century, Ireland was in full rebellion. The Earl of Essex had been sent over as lord deputy, but he had met the rebellious Tyrone in a mysterious peaceful interview at the ford of Ballinahinch, and was neither the first nor the last to yield to suave Celtic personal charm. The English and the Irish noble met as enemies, they separated as friends. Essex went back to London, to his angry queen, his jealous rivals and his sad scaffold on Tower Hill; and Mountjoy, a man of sterner stuff, was sent over to break Irish resistance, to drown her patriotism in blood, and starve her men, women and children into submission. So Elizabeth settled the Irish problem in her day,—as far as problems are ever settled by "blood and iron." A few years later and Ireland was seething again with threatened rebellion. James tried another way. He decreed the expulsion of the native Irish from Ulster on the ground that the treason of their chiefs forfeited the rights of the peasantry to their lands; the expatriated natives scattered themselves through other parts of the land and the king carried out the "plantation of Ulster," the establishment of a British colony in the north of Ireland. The thrift, the enter-

prise, the favorable tenures, the fecundity of these Scotch-Irish Protestant settlers made Ulster a successful colony—but it is obvious that it did not settle, rather it complicated the Irish question.

Two hundred years later Ireland was again on fire. The rebellion of the United Irishmen of 1798—Protestants of the North and Catholics of the South united for once, fused in the crucible of the French Revolution—had been put down with atrocities that bear only too close a similarity to those which have recently shocked humanity. How did aristocratic England settle this crisis? The plan of the British ministry and parliamentary majority was to bring about a Union,—to merge the old Irish parliament of Dublin in the united English and Scotch parliament that sat at Westminster. This meant that the Irish parliament must be induced to commit political suicide, and votes for this purpose could only be obtained by bribery, bribery by money, by titles to peerages, by all the "dirty work," as Cornwallis called it, necessary in those days to create a parliamentary majority where none existed before. This was accomplished. Votes came high; for some the government had to pay as much as four thousand pounds. Seven thousand pounds was paid for each private constituency extinguished.

Altogether some one million two hundred thousand pounds was paid out of the Irish treasury and still remains a part of the permanent national debt. Thus the majority of the Irish parliament was induced to pass the Act of Union in 1800. It was a well-intentioned, good-natured, but not very enlightened effort to induce Ireland no longer to be rebellious. But

it was doomed to disrepute from the beginning by the dishonesty of its origin. It was diseased from the beginning with the canker of contempt—English contempt for the Irish, the conqueror's contempt for the conquered, the Protestant's contempt for the Roman Catholic, the land-lord's, who looked down on his tenant, the practical Anglo-Saxon looking down on the Celtic dreamer,—"the insolence of office," and all the varied forms of national incompatibility. It has been a dismal failure through the century of its existence.

No one could be so foolish as to declare that the Irish question has been settled within these last eighteen years, although there have been times when it has seemed on the verge of settlement. The long record of incompetent government, the fundamental mistakes of autocracy and oligarchy, the persistent stupidity of an alien and uncomprehending control, the political ineptitude of the Irish people, the curse of religious bigotry and the innate difficulties of the situation have made the problem of Irish political happiness and economic prosperity an almost unsolvable one. But a great step forward has been made in the democratic period. Five years ago the English ministry and the people agreed that the Irish people might choose their own form of government, if they could agree on one,—and if it did not involve complete separation from Great Britain. A home-rule bill was actually passed and is now only awaiting enforcement. An Irish convention was called by the government in order that Ireland might through it establish its own fate and decide whether home rule should come into existence. Even now it is only the dissidence of factions in Ireland that

deprives it of self-government. Over and over again it has been declared that Ireland might have home rule if Ulster and the South could agree, and I believe that is true today. Autocracy reduced Ireland by force to restless and momentary submission. Aristocracy bribed it for a while into sullen and unstable union. Democracy is leaving it, as it has left England's other great dependencies, Canada, Australia and South Africa, to a self-determination of its own destiny. Which is the more enlightened policy? Which of the three forms of government handles most wisely the problem of dependencies?

Let us now take a test from an entirely different sphere of life. Which form of government has done most for the encouragement of literature and learning? To name the period from 1600 to 1618, the later years of Elizabeth and the early years of James, is to point to the very acme and glory of English literature, and to a period of high attainment in learning. Remembering that these two short decades saw the creation of "The Merchant of Venice," "A Midsummer Night's Dream," "Hamlet," "Othello," "Lear," and "The Tempest"; of almost all the work of Ben Jonson and a score of other guests of the Mermaid tavern; of all the learned work of Bacon, of Hooker's "Ecclesiastical Polity" and of the authorized version of the Bible,—on such a list, I say, the claimant that despotic government is especially favorable to literature and learning might rest his case and demand a favorable verdict. But the problem to be solved is not "In which period was there the greatest literature?" but "In which period

was the government most favorable to learning and literature?"

The governments of Elizabeth and James can take little credit for the intellectual glory of their time. This was quite independent of those sovereigns, it existed almost in spite of them. An occasional five or ten pounds in reward for a play at Christmas or Shrovetide, some defense of the theatre by James against the Puritans, a ceremonial visit or two of the queen to the Universities,—such was all that learning and literature from 1600 to 1618 owed to the government. It was the swelling tide of English genius, not autocracy, that made this a great intellectual and literary age.

In the period from 1800 to 1818 there is little that is great in literature and this little was evidently not the result of government encouragement, for it included the founding of the Edinburgh Review, pledged by the very conditions of its origin and existence to opposition to the Tory government of the time. It included the appearance of Cobbett's Weekly Register, still more fundamentally devoted to opposition to aristocratic society. Coleridge and Wordsworth were still Radicals, while Shelley and Byron were the same rebels against authority that they always remained. All the genius that existed at the time was in rebellion against aristocracy, not under its patronage. There were many learned men, but they owed little to the government, and neither crown, ministry nor parliament gave encouragement to education, except occasional promotion to some favored personage connected with scholarship. The universities received no special attention from

the government, and there were as yet no schools supported by the state. An honorable exception in this barren age should be noted in the few grants made for the purchase of books for the British Museum.

England in our own time is not perhaps too well blest with great writers, but we must remember that she sent Lord Bryce, a literary man, as ambassador to America; that John Morley, the essayist, was made Lord Morley and given a seat in the ministry; that the present minister of education is an Oxford don and a substantial historian, and that in democratic England many other cabinet ministers are and have been men of letters. Numberless scientific, historical and learned projects are in receipt of public subsidies, and the schools have been specially favored by the government during these recent years. One of the greatest of the reforms now seriously proposed is a thorough revision of the whole system of English education, from the universities down. Each type of society no doubt, has its own intellectual reaction, and it may be that literature and learning have sometimes flourished under a mild autocracy; but certainly in the intellectual history of England no one of the forms of government we have studied has been so friendly to things of the mind as the plain democratic government of the last few years. It might have been anticipated that a form of government responsible in the last resort to the relatively uneducated and unintellectual masses of the people would give less favor to learning than a government by the more educated and leisured classes, or the government of a cultured autocrat. The opposite is nevertheless true. Neither with absolutism nor with

aristocracy has the higher culture been made so welcome as with democracy.

The remaining test to be applied is the service of the respective forms of government to humane progress. Legislation to abolish barbarous conditions and to advance justice and happiness, is a normal part of the work of government.

"Man never is but always to be blest."

The growth of human society is a process of evolution, which means that it is always striving to free itself from primitive and ever-recurrent savagery, and to adapt itself anew to new environments. Since government is the principal instrument of organized society it should occupy itself and actually does occupy itself largely with this process of introducing reforms.

If the statute book of the closing years of Elizabeth and the early years of James is searched for legislation of this type, it will be found that although there is much regulation of industries and oversight of morals, there is only one body of legislation which can be considered definitely humanitarian—the poor laws. In the early years of the nineteenth century, on the other hand, there was abroad in England a real humane spirit. Burns grieved over the "wee bit housie" of the field mouse, and even the "crimson tippèd flower" that he had disturbed with his plow. Clarkson and his friends appealed to humanity against the horrors of the slave trade, and some men were beginning to be sensitive even to the suffering in their own midst.

Let us see what was the attitude of the aristocratic majority in the Houses of Lords and Commons to pro-

posals to reduce suffering. In the forefront of our period, in the first parliament of the century, a bill was introduced to abolish bull-baiting, a brutal sport causing much suffering to both the bull and the dogs. The bill was promptly defeated, a prominent member protesting against such attempts to encroach upon the few amusements of the poor, and rebuking those who brought in the bill for listening to such "paltry local complaints—wholly unworthy of the legislature of this great nation." Somewhat later a general cruelty to animals bill was introduced, but it was first amended to apply only to draught animals useful to man, then defeated by a vote of thirty-seven to twenty-seven. Nor was there any legislation on this subject until far beyond the period I am reviewing. These were only questions of cruelty to animals. Just at the beginning of the century there were some shocking revelations of cruelties imposed upon what were called "climbing boys." These were little fellows, sometimes little girls, hired by master chimney sweeps to creep up and through the long tortuous flues of old-fashioned buildings, sweeping the soot as they went into bags dragged after them. There were about five hundred such boys in the city of London. They were employed as young as six and even five years of age. Since chimneys were sometimes only seven inches in diameter, the smaller the children the better fitted they were for their work. The course of the chimneys was bent and twisted, and there are lamentable stories of children sticking fast and smothering to death in these long, dark, gruesome passageways.

In 1804 a society was formed to improve the condi-

tion of these boys, and by its efforts an act was passed prohibiting the employment of children below eight years for this purpose. But it was so poorly drawn and so little approved by the government that it had no effect. In 1817 a committee of the House of Commons was appointed to examine into the matter and in accordance with its report, a bill was introduced raising the age of employment as chimney sweeps to fourteen years, but this proposal was defeated. Every year there was a struggle for some kind of regulation of this industry, but every year for a long period it failed. When passed by the House of Commons, the bill was defeated in the House of Lords. The arguments against it were characteristic of the period. What were poor boys to do if deprived of the opportunity to make a living in this way? To what other occupations could parish authorities bind pauper boys out? Could not parents be trusted to look after their own children? Could you not rely on the humane feelings of the community? Could you make the community humane by law? If the legislature laid down a moral code for the people, all private feelings of benevolence would die out. There would be much more danger of fire if climbing boys were abolished. So Earl Grosvenor, the Marquis of Lauderdale, the Lord Chancellor, reasoned, and in the very last year of our period the law was defeated again in the House of Lords by a vote of 32 to 12.

The long struggle of Sir Samuel Romilly and his associates to abolish the death penalty for petty offenses is almost too familiar to repeat. In almost every meeting of parliament of this period they brought up

some measure of reform, but the only victory they secured was that the punishment for picking pockets should be reduced from hanging to transportation for seven years. Proposals that petty thefts, shoplifting, sheep stealing and counterfeiting should be removed from the list of capital offenses were defeated again and again in parliament. It is true that the public whipping of women as a punishment for petty crime was abolished in 1817, but it was still permitted in workhouses, jails, penitentiaries and lunatic asylums. Need I go further to test the attitude of aristocratic government to humanitarian reforms? It is not merely that such barbarities existed, but that when attention was called to them and the more liberal men of the time pleaded for their abolition, the aristocratic leaders who dominated the English government opposed such action and under the sadly misused claim of "the preservation of law and order," kept the chains of oppression and injustice still riveted upon the poor, the ignorant, the inevitably criminal and those deprived of opportunity by the social organization of the time.

Much that is deplorable still exists in England, yet it is true that no reformer in parliament during the last eighteen years has failed to get a hearing and a measurably favorable response when he has proposed better care of children in the factories; more comfort and help for the aged, the halt, the maimed, the blind, the sick or the hurt; more protection of animals from cruelty; more prevention of suffering, so far as this can be secured through legislation. The heart of the great mass of mankind under democracy is as warm

as that of the governing classes under aristocracy was cold.

Other tests might be applied. Far back among the earliest records of the English government is to be found the king's coronation promise to give to his people justice and mercy in all legal judgments. The administration of justice is one of the most fundamental and universal of the functions of government. A comparison of the personal jurisdiction of Star Chamber under Elizabeth and James with the class jurisdiction of Lord Eldon and Chief Justice Ellenborough under the Georges and then with the work of the courts in the last eighteen years would be suggestive, but it would not be altogether fair to democracy. For in this period although ordinary criminal and civil justice is far more fairly administered yet a critical war has come with its reversion in several respects to earlier standards of law and earlier ideas of justice. There has been a recrudescence of martial law, with its primitive code, its crude procedure and its savage sentences, the revelations of whose activities is now arousing the shocked surprise of British and American newspapers, Parliament, Congress, the American Bar Association, and the English and American communities. The effect of the war has permeated much of the action of the courts. Fifteen hundred men are now, or were till very recently, in jail in England for acts which five years ago would have been no offense,—which involve no moral obliquity and in many cases represent a high degree of moral courage and devotion. I refer to the "conscientious objectors." A petition for

their release was lately presented to the prime minister signed by Lord Bryce, Lord Loreburn, the Marquis of Crewe, seventeen bishops and a host of other Englishmen of unquestioned patriotism. According to this report seven hundred of the conscientious objectors have already been in prison more than two years, the maximum sentence for ordinary criminals under the civil code, and many of them have suffered brutalities in the course of their experience. There are many other sufferers from the war-time reaction of the courts. But this is no part of the normal history of English law and its administration. It is characteristic of war-time, not of democracy.

So it is with many other painfully acquired and passionately valued possessions. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right of assembly and freedom of discussion have yielded to the exigencies of war. Along with the gallantry, the devotion, the self-sacrifice, the noble and sustained endeavor of the English people in the great war, have come back the credulity, the intolerance, the hate, the bitterness of the earlier ages to which war properly belongs. These again are not characteristic of democracy but of war-time. England on the eve of the war still possessed all the liberties she had ever acquired and there are already, to the joy of all true liberals everywhere, abundant signs of their early resumption now that the strain of war has been removed. It would be sad indeed if these civil rights should be lost in the country where they were first gained. There has been a certain amount of intellectual and moral decadence as a result of the war. But the moral and intellectual costs of the war, like

its economic losses, its physical suffering and its mental distress, should not be charged to the account of democracy but should be looked upon as part of the price we have paid for the rescue of democracy from a great danger.

In the comparison we have now made, I think it can be fairly said that democracy, tested by many and varied standards, has shown a clear superiority to other forms of government. In finance it has secured more abundant and more equitable collection of funds and has expended them with more enlightenment; in war it has shown greater energy, unity and endurance, and yet it stands more ready to abolish war; in its relations to dependent peoples it has turned its back on the discredited methods of force and fraud, and entered on that career of self-abnegation which alone seems to promise success; its interest in intellectual and literary and artistic life is more warm and catholic than that of either autocracy or aristocracy; and, finally, it has shown a more ardent, more discerning and more persevering desire to lift the lives of all its citizens to higher levels of security, well-being and happiness than has any earlier form of government.

So far as appears from this necessarily restricted comparison of three typical periods of English history, the best form of government is not the concentrated power of absolute monarchy, nor is it the rule of the wealthy, established upper classes,—that is the worst of the three,—but it is that degree of completeness of control of its own destinies by the mass of the people that has been so far attained, and which in our optimism we already call democracy, the people's rule.

Moreover we can get a glimpse of what democracy is to be. We have, as it were, climbed a long ascent and we can see from the heights where we now stand something of the land of the future that lies before us. It is a land of more complete democracy. Popular government is still crude, cumbrous and unresponsive to the popular will. Devices are already being worked out to improve it; initiative, referendum and recall, more frequent elections, a greater devolution of powers, devices which will establish a closer *rapport* between a representative and his constituency. In the last election to the British parliament 459 members of the coalition were elected, 142 members of the anti-coalition parties. That is to say the majority has about 75% of the members of the new parliament, the minority about 25%. But the majority had only 52% of the votes cast, the principal minority parties had 47%. There was only a difference of 5% in the vote though the one party elected more than three times as many candidates as the other. This means that in the constituencies won by the victorious party the majorities were but small, in those in which the defeated party were successful they were overwhelmingly large.

Minorities but slightly smaller than the majorities will therefore remain without a voice until next election. It is to meet this difficulty that the system of "proportional representation," or the representation of minorities, which is being so widely urged and which came so near to being included in the recent Reform Bill has been proposed. Certainly the present system, where only the majority in any constituency is repre-

sented, and that by a representative elected for a considerable time and with inadequate means of learning the desires of those whom he represents, is not a complete or satisfactory system of self-government. In many other ways our democracy is imperfect. We are still at the beginning, not at the completion of the development of political democracy. It is an unfortunate habit to think that democracy has been attained once for all. It must be worked out, developed and perfected.

Moreover, judging from past events and many present tendencies, democracy will not be merely political, it will be an industrial democracy also. The formula, "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity," which emerged from the first great forum of democracy in modern times, the French Revolution, has proved impossible of realization when interpreted only in terms of political institutions. Men are not free in any real sense when they are bound by ignorance, the necessity of uninterrupted toil and the constant fear of unemployment and consequent poverty. Men cannot be politically equal when some have abundant means and opportunity while others have neither. Men cannot be fraternal when they are so largely divided into competing classes, employers and employed, rich and poor, those who have property and those who have not. Liberty, equality and fraternity must include economic elements before they can become real. It was one who lived under an aristocracy, though he was a worshipper of democracy, who in his appeal to Freedom declared that she must provide material support and intellectual opportunity as well as relief from oppression.

"For the laborer thou art bread
And a comely table spread
From his daily labour come
To a neat and happy home.

Thou art clothes and fire and food
For the trampled multitude
. . . . . .
Science, poetry and thought
Are thy lamps; they make the lot
Of the dwellers in a cot
So serene they curse it not."

Freedom has done little enough during the century that has passed since Shelley wrote these lines to abolish poverty and to secure "clothes and fire and food" for all. This work still lies before us, and it must be done by economic as well as political means. A recent British government report remarks "the men of England have gone to the continent to fight against Prussianism; they have learned what it is and have returned determined to destroy it in industry." It is not merely working men, it is their employers as well who are dissatisfied with old industrial conditions and are feeling their way toward new. Mr. Schwab, a typical American industrial leader, has lately declared his belief that the laborers themselves will, in the near future, share largely in the control of business. The plan of "workshop committees," by which the workmen take over a large group of services previously exercised by the management has lately spread rapidly and widely among the larger businesses of England and our own country.

Probably the most broadly conceived, carefully drawn, and far-reaching public document now lying for consideration before English speaking people is the program of the British Labour party which they call "Labour and the New Social Order." It describes the structure of social democracy which they wish England to build in these days of reconstruction after the war. It proposes, first, to guarantee to every citizen the requisites for a healthy and worthy life; second, to introduce democratic control of industry in the interest of the whole community; third, a fundamental alteration in the whole system of taxation by which the capital and income needed by the community can be secured; and fourth, the use of whatever the nation produces beyond the needs of a comfortable subsistence to each one to raise the standard of living for the common good of all. These plans are worked out in much detail, and the line of development pointed out where plans are not given. This is one program of industrial democracy; its practicability claims to have been deduced from the experiences of the war, and its desirability is asserted as being merely the application of democracy to other aspects of society than the political.

Although the recent election only doubled the representation of the Labour Party in parliament instead of tripling or quadrupling it as its leaders had prophesied, Premier Lloyd George has already pledged himself to some of the essential points of its program: the erection at government expense of some hundreds of thousands of laborers' dwellings, the establishment of a minimum standard below which wages must not fall, the self-government of various lines of industry by the

appointment of joint workshop committees. I do not think anyone can look closely at the course of events in England, especially during and since the war, and not believe that democracy will, within the century we have now begun, enter upon a conquest of industry analogous to that which it has achieved in the political field in the century that has just passed.

Another characteristic of the democracy of the future already visible is that it will be anti-military. Every one of the parties in the recent election in England declared against a continuance of conscription. The great act for the reorganization of British education which is now under consideration in parliament has deliberately excluded military training from all grades of the schools on the ground that it has "neither educational nor military value." The prime minister has declared his belief that such peace terms will be made as will preclude the necessity of military preparation. The ever-recurring cry of the soldiers during the war has been that there shall be no more war. In England there is a deep, fervent and general hatred of war and determination that nothing shall ever occur to drag England again into war, that we, with our shorter experience of the war and our greater distance from it, and perhaps our more idealistic temperament, scarcely realize or share. While the more conservative elements in England and elsewhere are hesitating and doubting and disputing about the League of Nations, the mass of the people are everywhere full of faith and willing to make any sacrifice for peace and for a League of Nations that promises peace. The strongest impression made by the cheering millions that have

pressed around Mr. Wilson in London, Manchester, Paris, Rome and Milan is the pathos of it. The people are looking for a Moses to lead them out of the Egyptian bondage of old contests and old injustice; they are longing for a world in which there shall be peace, and in this one man, because they look upon him as the representative of this and of all ideal democracy, are centred their hope and their trust. They may not be able to secure the objects for which they long, but their longing proves that the great democracy of the world is determined that for one thing there shall be no more war.

Again, democracy will be favorable to individual independence. That ideal of society which seeks a disciplined, obedient people, submissive to government and unquestioning in its acceptance of orders, is not a democratic ideal. You cannot have an atmosphere of "implicit obedience to authority" and at the same time and in the same place an atmosphere of democratic freedom. There is only one kind of discipline that is adequate to democracy and that is self-discipline. An observant foreigner has lately remarked, somewhat paradoxically, that the Americans seem to him the best disciplined people in the world. In no other country does a line form itself at a ticket office or at the entrance to a place of amusement with so little disorder, so little delay and so little help from a policeman. In no other country would an appeal of the government for self-control in the use of food or fuel, for a restriction of hours of business, for "gasless Sundays," have met with so ready, so generous and so sufficient a response. Our American lads, alert, adaptable, swiftly-

trained, self-directed, have been with their independent activity quite the equal of the Continental soldiers, with their longer technical training and more rigorous military discipline. In these respects the English, and especially the British colonial soldiers, have been much like our own. Democracy, whether for peace or for war, in America or in England, favors individuality. Independence of thought and of action on the part of the mass of the people are alike the result of democracy and the condition of its continuance and more complete development, and they are visibly growing in England as the trammels of old political and social class control are being thrown off.

There arises just now one more question concerning democracy. What are its relations to the soviet, or popular council system of government, and to the Bolshevist program of economic and social reform that seem to be spreading westward from their Russian source of power? Bolshevism, as it has come to be called, the proposal of a sudden radical change in the economic powers of government for the purpose of bringing about improvement in the condition of the lower classes at the expense of the upper, is the most impressive force in the world today. The old armed and aggressive Germany is no longer a danger to the rest of the world. That bad dream is over. The world may rest easy so far as the Prussian danger to its orderly development is concerned. But this threat is more difficult to meet. It is easier to resist armies than to resist ideas. No boundary fortresses or strategic defenses will prevent the invasion of thought. "As a man thinketh in his heart so is he." If the great majority of men

in any nation come to believe in the desirability of a certain policy that policy will eventually be carried out. Even if only a considerable minority desire a change and the existing condition is susceptible of serious criticism, attempts, successful or unsuccessful, to change it are apt to be made.

It is difficult in this country at this time to judge of Bolshevism in Russia. A thick curtain of censorship was long drawn between us and Russia. Correspondent after correspondent has returned and told how his dispatches filed in Russia did not reach America. Much of what comes to America is not printed in the newspapers; much of what is printed is obviously untrue; much is evidently vastly exaggerated. A cloud of doubt hangs over the authenticity of an appreciable part even of what has been published with the stamp of government assurance upon it. The explanations that are being made today before the Senate committee at Washington are of extreme value and interest; but differences of opinion and even of statements of fact are so great that it is hard to reach conclusions. A cautious student is therefore driven to make his judgments from the few actual public documents that have been published in this country and from a critical acceptance of what is reported by returning newspaper correspondents, Red Cross agents and other observers.

Judging from its own documents, Russian Bolshevism is not democratic. The soviet type of government may in itself be democratic. It is a somewhat primitive type of government by general assemblies of the people, like the town meetings of New England, but with two differences, first, that the councils represent people en-

gaged in particular industries as well as people living in particular localities, and secondly, central government is made up of delegates from these councils; it is not separately elected. Whereas democracy would admit all men and women to participation in the work of government and then proceed to control and reorganize social and economic institutions as should seem most wise and just, the constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic adopted under the influence of the Bolshevist party, July 10, 1918, in Article 4, Chapter 13, grants the right to vote and hold office only to those who are and have been working men, to peasants who work their own ground, and housekeepers. It specifically excludes from participation in the government employers, recipients of income from capital or landed property, merchants, business men and clergymen. That is to say, the Bolshevist government denies to those who have shared in many of the activities of present society participation in introducing changes in the framework of that society. Their government is, as they themselves describe it, "a dictatorship of the proletariat"—it is not a stage in the development of society toward a more and more complete democracy. The attainment of democracy is a historical process, a development, a continuous movement; not merely a device. Their system is marked by exclusion not by inclusion. The Bolshevist soviet system denies to many of those who have shared in the attainment of such popular government as we possess the opportunity to help in carrying that self-government further. It creates a new class of sufferers under tyranny. It is, for the time at least, a domination of all society in

Russia by one class, the Bolshevist working man. The Bolshevist argument that eventually all men will be of this one class and therefore all will participate in the government begs the question as to whether this change is desired by a considerable majority of the community. It is the dominance of force, not of reason or of numbers. It is afraid to leave the question to a vote, and insists on settling it according to a preconceived and pedantic ideal without an expression of the general judgment.

What shall be the attitude of existing democracies to this plan? In Russia the issue is already joined, and there is no justification in morals, political wisdom, or self-interest for any other nation to interfere. It is moreover already evident that the democratic sentiment of England and of America is in revolt against continued occupation of Russia. Russia must work out her own salvation. It is true that Russia is starving, and if America or the more prosperous nations of Europe can take food and equipment for self-support into Russia they will be doing a good work. They will be helping men to see and determine on their future with clearer eyes and stronger courage. But they must leave their guns behind them.

So far Bolshevism has asserted itself actively only to countries recently autocratic; that is, in Russia, Germany and Hungary. Democratic countries have as yet been immune. Will they remain so? There is one method and one method only to guarantee this result. That is by the development of a more complete democracy. There are grave evils, there is grave discontent in all the advanced countries of the world. The influence

of Russia on this discontent is two-fold, partly perhaps intentional, by the direct efforts of the present government of Russia to induce the same classes in other countries to take control as have control in Russia; secondly, unintentional,—the indirect influence of the Russian example. The former I believe to be very slight, the latter very large. There are quite enough disturbing influences native in each country to make the direct Russian influence practically negligible.

To send a few radicals to prison, to deport a few foreigners, to suppress a few newspapers, to break up a few meetings, to proscribe the red flag, are useless gestures. All these means of opposing the spread of ideas have been tried under autocracy and under class aristocracy and they have always failed. To misrepresent facts in the newspapers or in speeches, to talk on the subject without taking the trouble to understand it, is no better; it is worse than useless; it is helpful to the cause of discontent. Not in this way can the extension of any such group of beliefs be checked. There is, as I have said, one way and one way only to attain the end, that is by removing the conditions which are justly subject to criticism,—or in other words to perfect our democracy.

Any community which is seriously engaged in the work of developing a more complete political and industrial democracy will at the same time be disarming militant Bolshevism, as it will every other form of revolutionary action. An England adopting more thoroughgoing Representation of the People Acts, making her people more and more free, extending the provisions of her factory acts, her education acts, in-

surance and minimum wage laws; providing against unemployment; making her taxation system more just; developing her resources in the interest of all her people alike, not for special interests; taking thought that poverty should be abolished and the opportunity of a decent life be provided for every man, woman and child in the land, a democratic England so occupied,—an America so occupied,—has nothing to dread from Bolshevism. If it has anything to teach us we should gladly learn. It would be strange if idealistic Russia after the wonderful achievements of the last two years had nothing to teach us. But if we are engaged in active and intelligent reform the stately march of democracy will not be turned aside by Russian influence from its advance toward greater human justice, equality, enlightenment and happiness.

V

WHAT IS HISTORY?

HAT is history? Let us go to the Father of History and ask him. Herodotus introduces his work by saying, "This is a publication of the researches of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, in order that the actions of men may not be effaced by time, nor the great and wondrous deeds displayed both by Greeks and barbarians deprived of renown, and why the Greeks and barbarians waged war on one another."

His object, that is to say, is to recount the actions of men and the causes of them. It is true that the actions which he is to recount are only the great actions, and the men whose deeds are thought worthy of notice are only the great men. All the rest of mankind with all their doings are relegated to a dim and misty obscurity. Nevertheless, the main idea of Herodotus is clear. He does not want a good story to be lost and forgotten, therefore he will tell us what happened. He looks upon history simply as a tale of the doings of men.

Other Greek and later historians have looked upon the matter differently. Thucydides says, "Perhaps the

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lack of wonderful stories in my work will make it less pleasing to my readers; but it will be enough for me if it proves to be useful to those who want to have a clear knowledge of the past, and thereby of that which, according to the course of human events, will happen again." According to Thucydides, therefore, history is not merely a narrative, it should be useful. Polybius, likewise, criticizing Herodotus says, "It is not enough merely to describe the course of events, one must seek to understand the why and the wherefore of them, in order to draw instruction therefrom." A German historian of the seventeenth century says, "History is that which teaches the reader what things in life are useful and to be followed, or injurious and to be avoided." A modern English historian says, "History is a voice forever sounding across the centuries the law of right and wrong." That is to say, according to this view of the case, history is meant to instruct. It should teach some lesson. The lesson may be a political one or a moral one or a religious one. But it is always history with a purpose,—its justification is ethical.

Far and wide through historical writing can be found this ideal. Sometimes it is consciously and strongly held. There is a work in eight volumes in the University Library with the title "The History of England on Christian Principles." Sometimes it is less consciously and clearly acknowledged, and yet the historian none the less tells his story under its influence. Macaulay is a devotee of the Whig party and is teaching its doctrines when he is writing his history of the seventeenth century as well as when he is speaking or voting in parliament in the nineteenth. Froude uses

his history of England to teach the evils of the Roman Catholic Church and to discredit Anglican clericalism, exactly as he uses any of his other forms of writing.

The moral purpose of the historian often appears as a patriotic purpose. Bancroft wrote his history in such a way that Americans should think well of their country, much as Gilbert Stuart painted Washington in such a way that Americans should feel universal admiration for the Father of his Country. Livy in writing the history of Rome is obviously trying to teach his readers devotion to it.

This patriotic sentiment is not only the most familiar form of history with a moral purpose, but it has lent much spirit and interest to historical writing. Green's "History of the English People" is permeated by a gentle and sincere patriotism that conciliates his readers and casts a glamour over the whole of English history. Thiers' admiration for Napoleon and devotion to France have infused a fire into his "Consulate and Empire" that have led to their constant republication in France and other countries. Treitschke and Sybel have given a genuine popular defense for the modern Prussian state in their great histories of Germany in the nineteenth century.

Patriotic history, when mixed with certain other ingredients, forms excellent poetry. Kipling makes his two English children standing on a Sussex hillside learn their history from the fairy Puck as he points out to them its visible marks around them.

"See you the dimpled track that runs,
All hollow through the wheat?

O that was where they hauled the guns
That smote King Philip's fleet.

See you our little mill that clacks,
So busy by the brook?
She has ground her corn and paid her tax
Ever since Domesday Book.

See you our stilly woods of oak,
And the dread ditch beside?
O that was where the Saxons broke,
On the day that Harold died.

See you the windy levels spread
About the gates of Rye?
O that was where the Northmen fled,
When Alfred's ships came by.

See you our pastures wide and lone,
Where the red oxen browse?
O there was a city thronged and known,
Ere London boasted a house.

And see you, after rain, the trace
Of mound and ditch and wall?
O that was a Legion's camping-place,
When Cæsar sailed from Gaul.

And see you the marks that show and fade,
Like shadows on the Downs?
O they are the lines the Flint Men made,
To guard their wondrous towns.

Trackway and camp and city lost,
Salt marsh where now is corn,

Old wars, old peace, old arts that cease,
And so was England born!"

How much of long past and recently past history is reflected in the present poet-laureate's fine appeal of England to Ireland:

"Spouse whom my sword in the olden time won me,
Winning me hatred more sharp than a sword;
Mother of children who hiss at or shun me,
Curse or revile me, and hold me abhorred;
Heiress of anger that nothing assuages,
Mad for the future and mad for the past,
Daughter of all the implacable ages,
Lo, let us turn and be lovers at last!

Lovers whom tragical sin hath made equal,
One in transgression and one in remorse,
Bonds may be severed, but what were the sequel?
Hardly shall amity come of divorce.
Let the dead past have a royal entombing,
O'er it the future build white for a fane!
I that am haughty from much overcoming
Sue to thee, supplicate, nay, is it vain?

Hate and mistrust are the children of blindness,—
Could we but see one another, 'twere well!
Knowledge is sympathy, charity, kindness,
Ignorance only is maker of hell.
Could we but gaze for an hour, for a minute,
Deep in each other's unfaltering eyes,
Love were begun, for that look would begin it,
Born in the flash of a mighty surprise."

History moreover can be written, has been frequently written, in prose as lofty as poetry, in such a way that certain moral or religious or political principles, broad and fundamental or narrow and contentious, are brought out. In the vast mass of historical facts the historian will naturally find those that he seeks, and he may, if he will, arrange his materials and make moral reflections upon them in accordance with his beliefs and preconceptions.

But this ideal costs its price. The historian under its influence feels called upon to make ethical judgments of actions and of men,—defending or condemning historical personages and their actions. Men of the past are thought of as models to be followed or warnings of what is to be avoided, or at least as objects of admiration or dislike. This leads to the habit of ascribing extreme historical importance to the character and work of individuals and correspondingly little influence to the general conditions of the time or to the great mass of people. Good and bad motives can be ascribed to persons, not to the conditions of civilization that surround them; certain named persons can be praised or blamed, the great unnamed masses cannot be. So the historian dilates on the psychological and moral characteristics of a few prominent individuals and supposes them to have had great freedom of action and an unbounded extent of influence. Motley's William of Orange and Philip of Spain, Carlyle's Robespierre and Cromwell, Froude's Henry VIII, Macaulay's William III, and a crowd of lesser heroes of lesser historians owe much of their conspicuous position in his-

tory to the admiration or condemnation of them in the minds of their historians; and history itself comes to be looked upon as the acts of a few great men using the rest of mankind simply as their instruments.

But the greatest price we have to pay for this ethical attitude toward history is the intense subjectivity it gives to it. Everything comes to the reader as interpreted by the historian. Everything is seen through the medium of his personality. The facts of history when they are used to teach a moral lesson do not reach us in their entirety, not grouped and generalized according to their internal relations, but selected and arranged according to the overmastering ideal in the mind of the historian. The reader is at the historian's mercy. The same set of facts, that is to say the history of the same country or period, comes to us a Catholic, a Protestant or an Anglican history, according to the lesson that the historian wants to teach. We have histories of the French Revolution from the French, the English and the German,—from the republican and the royalist points of view. A certain series of events will appear entirely different under this ideal, according as the person who recounts them is a rationalist or a devotee. We must balance Whig against Tory, Northerner against Southerner. The conflicts of the past are perpetuated by the very chroniclers who recount their history. Thus history sells its birthright of truth for a mess of the pottage of partisanship. If the function of history is to teach, it fulfils it but ill when the lesson to be drawn from it depends so largely on the interpreter.

But let us turn to another ideal. We may find it also among the ancients. Phylarchus is described by a contemporary as "amazing his readers by a series of thrilling anecdotes," as, "studying dramatic propriety like a writer of tragedy." Livy speaks of the new historians of his time as believing that they can "by their skill in the art of writing improve on the rudeness of ancient writers." We have similar modern aphorisms. "History should make the past live again." "A history should always be an epic." This is a literary or aesthetic ideal. Its choice of subject, its selection of material, its forms of arrangement and statement are dominated by literary, almost by artistic, feeling. History is looked upon as a branch of literature. Just as the former view of history was that it should instruct, so this is that it should please. Daunou, in his *Cours d'études historiques*, delivered at the Collège de France seventy-five or eighty years ago, brings out clearly this view of history. He advises the writer of history to read modern novels as example. He says: "They will teach the method of giving an artistic pose to persons and events, of distributing details, of skilfully carrying on the thread of the narrative, of interrupting it, of resuming it, of sustaining the attention and provoking the curiosity of the reader." In as far as the historian is under this influence he feels the same intellectual elevation, the same creative activity as the writer of a literary essay, a work of fiction, a poem. When Motley, for instance, in his "Rise of the Dutch Republic," describes the scene at the punishment of Ghent by the Emperor Charles V; its civic officials in their black robes, the military bodies, the guildsmen thronging the

hall and the populace crowding the streets, his mind reverts to another great epic scene where

> "High on a throne of royal state, which far
> Outshone the wealth of Ormuz or of Ind,
> Or where the gorgeous east with richest hand
> Showers on her kings barbaric pearls and gold,
> Satan exalted sat."

and he closes his own description with the fine parody, "High on his throne, with the Queen Regent at his side, surrounded by princes, prelates and nobles, guarded by his archers and halberdiers, his crown on his head and his sceptre in his hand, the Emperor exalted sat." That is to say, Motley is writing in much the same spirit as Milton.

Such an ideal leads to the selection of dramatic periods for treatment. Froude begins his history with the fall of Wolsey, when the conflict between the English king and the Roman Catholic system was definitely joined, and announces that it is to extend to the death of Elizabeth. But when Mary, Queen of Scots, has been executed, when the Invincible Armada has been defeated, and the great contest he has been describing seems to be settled, his dramatic sense tells him that the play, conceiving his period of English history as a play, is over. Therefore, as a dramatist rather than as a historian, he draws down the curtain, closes his book and leaves the narrative of the last fifteen troubled, difficult and important years of the period he had announced untold. The military conquest of Mexico and Peru by brilliant Spanish *conquistadores* attracted their historian much earlier than the spread

of civilized settlement and peaceful development over the interior of the United States. Periods of war have always attracted more historians than have periods of peace.

This treatment gives to history the charm possessed by every work of art. Vigor, grace, color, life flourish under the dominion of the literary spirit and thrive among literary associations. Macaulay's fine impressiveness, the picturesque delineations of Prescott and Irving, the grace and eloquence of the French historians of the early nineteenth century, are due for the most part to the prominence of the literary ideal in the minds of these writers.

But accompanying these qualities and, unfortunately, almost always characterizing the literary treatment of history, is its weak hold on reality, its incautious use of materials. In as far as a historian is influenced by this ideal, he is thinking first of his reader, only secondarily of his facts. He is striving to produce an aesthetic effect, not to elucidate the past. Therefore he does not look narrowly at what he finds in his contemporary sources. He carelessly misinterprets them, he neglects much that is there but which is not suited to literary uses; he sometimes finds things that are not there at all. His creative imagination is apt to act like that of the poet:

"As imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.
Such tricks hath strong imagination."

The use of the imagination is an absolute necessity in all intellectual production, but it is also a dangerous foe to clear and exact knowledge. We live in hereditary servitude to our imagination. Through a long line of descent it has possessed a supremacy against which the thoughtful man must struggle for intellectual freedom. This is a matter of evolution and is universal in its action. The bird or the rabbit that perceives a dark shadow passing over it immediately sees or thinks it sees the spreading wings, the curved talons, and the hungry beak of the hawk swooping down on it, as it cowers close among the grass or leaves, although the shadow may be only that of a passing cloud. Primitive man must have learned to spring to shelter at many a harmless crackling among the bushes that nevertheless brought into his mind a picture of some hungry wild beast; or else we, his remote descendants, would not be here. And the brain that we have inherited from him has not forgotten its old trick of self-deception. We, as he did, live in a world of self-created ideas, only kept measurably close to reality by the most rigorous mental habits. The historian is subject to the common temptation; so in the mind of Motley grows up the picture of an imaginary Philip II, a cruel, calculating, malevolent being, sitting in his study at Madrid, holding the threads of a great conspiracy against the happiness and well-being of the people of half of Europe and even America. So Livy and Tacitus and a crowd of other historians, like the poets and the moralists, look back to a purely imaginary early period of virtue and honor and unselfishness. So our historical traditions become full of extraordinarily good and

extraordinarily bad people; certain periods are described as pre-eminently happy and others as unspeakably miserable; institutions are believed to have existed which would have been destructive to the human race; historic shadows are apt to fall preternaturally dark and the lights to glow incredibly bright. Imagination plays a brilliant but a deceptive part in history.

The borderland between history as a form of literature and historical fiction is a shifting and an uncertain one. Well on one side of the boundary we have fine constructive historical literature; well on the other, we have admirable if fanciful historical novels; but between the two there is a debatable land where outlaws continually dwell,—some of the histories of Thierry, Froude, and Thomas Watson, for instance; some of the novels of Chateaubriand, Georg Ebers, and Miss Mühlbach and their congeners,—exiled from the more orderly regions on both sides by the critics, historical or literary, who represent established rule in both realms.

There are still other historical ideals. One man, a philosopher, says that the proper object of history is the training of the time-concept. That is to say, the life of a single man is so short that it is only by considering the life of the whole human race that we can get any adequate idea of the meaning of the expression "time." I am inclined to believe that more than one of my specialist colleagues in this Faculty look on history as a sort of background of general occurrences and conditions on which their special objects of interest are projected; a sort of Greek chorus to explain and comment, while the development of English or French

or German literature, or mathematics, or political economy, or chemistry, or philosophy, occupies the centre of the stage. And far be it from me to deny the name of history to any of the forms of writing we have discussed. History is not a definite technical term, like geometry, or chemistry, or logic, or astronomy. It is a broad, general expression, more nearly analogous to the words "science" or "philosophy" or "art." In actual usage, even by historians, it connotes little more than the fact that the matters under consideration occurred in the past rather than in the present. There are not merely two forms, good history and bad history. There may be many types of reasonably good history. Nor is any one writer entirely under the domination of any one historical ideal; several may exist coincidently in his mind; he may at different times be influenced more largely by one or another conception of his subject; nevertheless the fact remains that the ethical, the literary and the specialist's types of history that have now been reviewed have been and are especially widespread and influential.

I want now to turn to another ideal, which looks at history from no one of these points of view; which conceives of it neither as primarily intended to give instruction nor primarily to give pleasure; which does not place it in the service of any other particular branch of knowledge, but allows it to exist for its own sake. According to this conception of history, the past is looked at simply, directly, objectively; it is conceived of as merely something to be described and explained.

Just as the geologist studies the physical conforma-

tion of a country, its strata and its fossils, and endeavors to understand and then to describe the conditions they indicate; just as the astronomer makes his observations and calculations and reaches the results of his study; just as the student of any branch of knowledge approaches his subject, so the historian may approach the past of the human race, study what mankind has done and said and thought, strive to understand, strive to explain. He can look upon his subject as simply a body of facts, to be investigated and described for their own sake; not with a view of drawing a lesson from them, not with a view of praising or blaming any one, not with a view of so choosing and putting the facts as to give emotional pleasure to the reader,—not, in fact, with any ulterior purpose whatever; but simply to take human history as his object of study,—just as one might take any other group of phenomena.

This is the modern scholar's conception of history, as contrasted with the ethical or the literary conception. It might be called the scientific method of treating history. The scientific method means nothing more than the simple method; the direct approach to a subject, seeking knowledge for its own sake, without ulterior objects or ultimate expectations of any kind from it, using accurate methods of observation, logical processes of classification, trained powers of comprehension and explanation,—that is all that a scientific method means,—and it is just as applicable to history as to any other field of knowledge.

Such an answer to the question, what is history?—such an historical ideal, has, like others, its own rewards and its own demands. It must not be supposed,

in the first place, that such historical work is necessarily a thankless or an unappreciated task. More than fifty years ago a fellow townsman of ours, Mr. Lea, took up the study of the history of medieval law and certain medieval and early modern institutions, especially those connected with the church. He is still at work in that field, and at this very moment, in all probability, his fine gray head is bending over the proof sheets of the fourth and final volume of his "History of the Spanish Inquisition." He had from the beginning an intense desire to know and an open mind. He felt no attraction to polemical and secondary discussions, but went direct to the raw material from which all historical knowledge must be obtained. He has had means that have enabled him to gather in his own library a great body of such sources of history as are published, and to have many manuscripts copied from the libraries of Europe; he has applied keen mental powers and infinite industry and perseverance to these materials, and has given to the world just what he has found. This has been embodied in some fifteen volumes, which have been published from time to time during the half century of his labors. They are not, of course, popular history, and their titles are not such as to conciliate popular interest. Nevertheless many thousand copies and repeated editions have been printed, disseminated and read; they are to be found in every public and many private libraries; every scholar interested in the history of the Middle Ages knows and uses them; every professor of history who teaches that period requires his students to read parts of them; they have been translated into various languages, and they stand

now as representing the principal body of acquired knowledge in that portion of the history of the world. In many circles in many cities of Europe you might name over the list of Philadelphia's business men, lawyers and physicians, and find that not a name was recognized. The first gleam of recognition to give comfort to our local patriotism would come with the mention of Henry C. Lea.

We might come still nearer home in our search for a test of appreciation of purely scholarly history. In our midst,—I refer to the head of my own department,—is one who, when American history was invariably written with one tendency or another, began the writing of it absolutely without partisanship; who, when the romantic episodes of colonial days were familiar but the period since the Revolutionary War relatively unknown, began to tell the great story of our national existence; who, when the historical material used was only that found in statutes, legislative proceedings, public correspondence and other such official documents, examined and utilized all the sources for the knowledge of our past. With no special lesson to teach or philosophy to maintain, and only interested to find out and to understand and to explain, he entered on the survey of all the varied interests of our nation since we have been a nation and in this spirit has written the "History of the People of the United States." It has become one of our "standard" histories. Some thirty thousand copies are spread through the community, to exercise with similar modern works a widespread influence.

The history of our national period is now at least

as well known as that of the colonial period, the times of peace have been raised in general estimation to at least as high a level of interest as those of war, the prevailing attitude toward the study of the first century of our national history is one of non-partisanship, there is no longer any body of historical material which is completely neglected. The influence of such work on methods of study has been even deeper than its addition to our knowledge. Now the mere post-graduate student of American history approaches his subject from a direction, and uses material that twenty-five years ago the veteran did not know. The very completeness with which the work has been accomplished is apt to blind us to its extent; but it cannot diminish the service performed by, or the honor due to, the pioneer who first hewed out a way for himself and for us. It is not therefore the admiration of a pupil for his teacher, it is not loyalty to a colleague, it is no mere attachment to a friend, that leads me to take as an example of not unappreciated and yet purely objective treatment of history, calm, impersonal, unprejudiced as to persons or as to parties, dominated by the single object of making clear the past, the work of Professor McMaster.

Not only is scholarly historical work not unappreciated by others, it is a worthy work for the man who does it. It calls for all the mental powers with which he may be endowed. Historical investigation is a work of infinite difficulty. Not only must the historian spend "laborious days and wakeful nights," but he must bring to his work ability and training. The material with which he has to work is enormous in amount, difficult

to collect, difficult to classify, difficult to interpret. The geologist, the chemist, the biologist, the student of literature, all make their own observations. The facts they work with are what they have themselves seen or can otherwise test by direct means. The historical facts with which we must deal come to us, for the most part, not through our own observations, but on the testimony of men who once saw or heard them but are now long dead. We must weigh and measure their credibility, their opportunity and their ability to have observed correctly. Our facts often come to us clothed in dead languages and obscure terms. We must find out just what these mean.

No power to put ourselves mentally into another's place can be too great for the historian's needs. We read the statements of a medieval or an ancient chronicler. He was a man of another age than our own, surrounded by institutions which have long since disappeared, ruled by ideas that are not our ideas, using the names of things that we have never seen. How shall we comprehend and interpret what he tells us? Here is the need for the historic imagination; its normal use is in understanding and interpreting the sources, not in writing the final draught of the narrative.

No keenness of mental analysis is too great for historical uses. Historical facts are often the actions, the words, the very thoughts and motives of men, and we must make a psychological judgment of them. No moral powers, no breadth of sympathy, no capacity for entering into the feelings as well as the thoughts of other men come amiss. For the scholarly historian must understand, and in a certain sense take part with both

sides of all the controversies of the past. He must appreciate the horror of the orthodox for heresy and he must sympathize with the heretic who cannot accept the teachings of those in authority. He must enter into the slave-holder's point of view, and he must comprehend the antagonism to slavery of the abolitionist. He must rise above the controversial elements in these conflicts and see why each party felt as it did. This can only be done by adding to a knowledge of the circumstances a genuine sympathetic comprehension of the feelings or belief of each side. A certain largeness of view is requisite for a study which is concerned with the doings of all mankind and with the thoughts and feelings of all representatives of our race.

No power over our glorious mother tongue can be spared by the scientific historian. Perfect clarity in stating the results of his investigations, the choice of the right word to represent every shade of human experience in the past, force to describe past conditions, and even eloquence to describe past events, all can be well utilized, so far as gifts or training put them into the possession of the historian. This, you may say, brings us back to history as a form of literature. Far from it. The question with which we have been concerned is of ideals, not of instruments. What I am now pleading for is literary power and effectiveness as a means, not as an end; as a tool in the hands of the scholarly historian, not as a final object to be sought for its own sake. So long as our historical ideal remains the accurate discovery and statement of what has occurred in the past, the use of all the resources of our

language is nothing more than a wise utilization of all available means to that end.

So there need be no fear that this historical ideal will not exercise all the powers that can be brought into its service. Moreover, it has its own exhilaration and charm. The scientific writer of history builds no Gothic cathedral, full of irregularities and suggestiveness, aspiring arches, niches filled with sacred or grotesque figures and aisles dim with religious light,—that is work for the literary historian. But he builds a classic temple: simple, severe, symmetrical in its lines, surrounded by the clear, bright light of truth, pervaded by the spirit of moderation. Every historical fact is a stone hewn from the quarry of past records; it must be solid and square and even-hued—an ascertained fact. Whether it is a deed, a word, a motive, a custom, a condition, it must have really existed in the past. And whether the historian is describing the life of some person or the history of some nation, a period of time, or a single aspect of the history of some period, the discovery of a country, the foundation of a commonwealth, or the progress of a revolution, or the formation of some treaty, or the inception of some war, he is still a builder. He must examine all his materials; he must know all the facts which can be ascertained concerning his subject; he must select those which are available for his purpose, those which really help to explain his subject; then he must write his history, erect his structure, build his temple, with what skill he may. His design already exists, the events have actually occurred, the past has really been; his task is to approach as near to the design as he possibly can.

Such is the ideal of history, such is that answer to the question with which we began, that I should like to submit to you as the worthiest; the attitude toward history that it is simply a body of material to be studied, understood and described, exactly as the biologist has his material, the chemist his, the mathematician his; except that it is infinitely more complex, more difficult, more fascinating than any.

I would suggest that this view of history is especially suited to the purlieus of a great university, where each field of human knowledge and interest has its devotees, animated by just the same spirit, dominated by just the same ideal. I would suggest that it is especially suited to such a university as the University of Pennsylvania, founded without political, religious or social bias; nurtured in freedom from control of any party or sect; at no time failing entirely to hold up the standard of human culture for its own sake; at the present time granting to its professors and students perfect liberty to investigate and declare the results of their investigations, to seek and to state the truth as they believe they have discovered it. I would suggest that this attitude toward history should especially appeal to post-graduate students. If an objective, direct, scientific habit of looking at one's work is once attained it is not easily lost. It will remain a solid foundation under the feet during all subsequent floods of reading, writing and controversy; a man or woman who has once done a piece of scientific work that is absolutely impregnable to assaults of criticism on its methods and its material may afterward safely add to his later work all the insight, all the powers of in-

terpretation, all the excellences of language that training and the experiences of life may bring to him. First critical study, then a scientific monograph, and then, if the fates allow, a great history.

You may say that to take away from the writing of history ethical and patriotic and political teaching as objects, and to depose it from its position as a form of pure literature, is to give it too humble a rôle to play,—that the scholarly historian is too lowly and too meek in his claims. But remember the beatitude "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth." The earth! What better inheritance could the historian wish? The earth with all its ancient nations, with all its crowding memories, with all the story of the human race that has been lived upon it. The historian may not, like the poet or the philosopher, rise to the heavens or deal with the eternities, but he can well be satisfied to trace the fortunes of humanity, with its joys and sufferings, its conflicts, its failures, its attainments; with all its keen interest,—because it is, after all, our common humanity.

VI

HISTORY AMONG THE SCIENCES

N a pageant representing the various branches of human knowledge, physics, chemistry, biology and other sciences would no doubt appear as vigorous men, mature though still youthful, alert, capable and aggressive. History on the other hand would doubtless be represented robed as an ancient bard or tricked out with the fantastic accoutrements of romance or panoplied for war. But pageants represent what is picturesque, external, traditional, not what is essential. Is this contrast between the natural sciences with their practical value, and history with only an emotional appeal justifiable? Does not history itself, as it is now studied, written and taught belong among the sciences?

The basic argument of one of the most stimulating and widely read of the serious books of our generation, James Harvey Robinson's "The Mind in the Making," is the contrast between the efficiency of the natural sciences and the inefficiency of history and the social sciences as they now stand. He points out that we have long discarded the authority of Aristotle in

Address before the Alumni Council of Amherst College, November 12, 1926.

physics and chemistry but still revere his views on human affairs; and quotes Mr. Wells' warm tribute in one of his novels to the superiority of the work of scientific men to that of "other educated sections of the community." Another almost equally widely read and suggestive work, Slosson's "Creative Chemistry," places the future of mankind and especially of America practically entirely in the keeping of the science of chemistry.

Again, is not this contrast overdrawn? Science is only a certain way of looking at things; a subject is scientific not because of its content but because of our method of approach to it. When any body of phenomena is the object of the serious study of a group of trained men, when accuracy of observation has been secured, when rigor of inference has become habitual, when the general results of its study can be stated in such a form that practically all well-informed persons will agree upon these statements, that study is a science. My claim is that history in the hands of its modern representatives is such a science. The phenomena it studies are all the actions, words and thoughts of men in the past, its methods are those of cautious observation of the records of these actions, with such skill in their classification and art in their presentation as the individual historian or teacher of history may attain to.

It may be conducive to clarity to point out in the beginning that the word history is used in common parlance in two quite different senses, one, past occurrences themselves, the other the narrative of those occurrences. At one moment history is what happened,

at another it is the narrative of what happened. When it is said that "much history is being made in these days" the speaker means that many events of importance are occurring. When on the other hand it is stated that "history should be interesting" the person using that phrase evidently is speaking not of the events, but of the writing about them. The second of these two meanings is much to be preferred. It should be remembered that Clio was the muse of written record, not, like Athene, the patroness of great deeds. The Greek word ἱστορία gives us both the English words, "history" and "story." History is a story—a record of the events of the past. So in this paper I shall be speaking of written, not experienced history. It must be acknowledged that history has not long been a science, although it is one of the oldest forms of literature. Modern science as usually understood has had a career of perhaps a hundred and fifty years. This is the sesqui-centennial year of many more things than the Declaration of Independence. News of the discovery of oxygen and Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" were both published in the year 1776; the early observations of Franklin in electricity were in that year just past and those of Herschell in astronomy just to come.

Of this century and a half it is the last third only that has seen history become truly a science. During that period the materials for a scientific study of history have been increased till they are approximately as numerous as those of any other science. The discoveries of new written records have been remarkable. They include materials as various as previously unknown manuscripts in European and American archives

and libraries, Greek and Roman inscriptions, Egyptian hieroglyphs and papyri, Babylonian tablets, Mayan calendars and Thibetan lamasery records. Altogether many hundreds of thousands of new documents have been added to those possessed by historians a half century ago. A still greater advance has been in the accessibility of sources already known to exist. Whole libraries and collections of manuscripts have been for the first time thrown open to the use of scholars. The Vatican Library was opened by Leo XIII, and its present librarian, a learned English historical scholar, offers a pressing invitation to all to exploit its records. The government archives of Austria, Germany and Russia have been opened to all comers, and the English government, under pressure from the historians, has opened its foreign office records down to the year 1878. There seems some reason to hope that with a more open diplomacy the governments of France, Italy, the United States, and other countries will adopt a less secret and suspicious policy and no longer withhold their national records from historical use.

Accessibility has been greatly advanced by putting manuscripts into printed form. Historical study done from manuscripts is necessarily laborious, slow and restricted in subject. Much can be achieved only by historians in the most fortunate of situations or contented to cultivate very narrow fields. But a vast amount of the raw material of history has now been put into printed and therefore usable form. Almost every modern government publishes series of historical materials at government expense. Societies interested in various fields of history have within the last fifty

years published thousands of volumes of those contemporary sources which the historian must use in his work. A modern investigator frequently, perhaps usually, finds the greatest part of his sources in printed form, and needs to travel to special localities and search through manuscript records for only the residuum of his needs. Many universities and other bodies are publishing series of monographs, which, whatever may be said of their intrinsic interest, are so carefully written and so well documented that they can be satisfactorily used as sources for historians working in wider fields. Young students who are now being trained in historical seminaries or engaged in historical research have an advantage in the abundance and accessibility of their material as compared with workers of one, two or three generations ago that is simply incalculable. It is much easier for them than for their predecessors to be scientific in their treatment of their subject.

The field of history has not only been enriched by new materials and these materials made more handy to use, but it has been extended into a far more distant past and broadened to include much adjacent territory. As the beginnings of the story of man on the earth are carried with our increased knowledge further and further into the past they do not, unfortunately, become more clear. Stone implements and burial mounds and an occasional fragment of a human skeleton are but poor substitutes for a series of brilliant chapters in Cæsar or Tacitus or even for an inscribed tablet or coin. Yet these may have the same importance for a scientific conception of history that fossil forms have

for biology. At least the very mass of early monumental record is illuminating. An English provincial museum like that at Dorchester, whose floor is paved with fragments of Roman brick found in the neighborhood, whose show-cases are full of bronze weapons and prehistoric pottery, and from whose windows we can see the lines of an old Roman road flanked on one side with the grassy slopes of a little amphitheatre, on the other with those of Maiden Castle, as old and mysterious, probably, to the Romans as it is to us,—such a collection in such surroundings is a repository of historical record, even if there is not a printed book or a manuscript under its roof.

One of the most interesting disclosures of aviation is the curious clearness with which ancient remains appear when looked at from the air which are unrecognizable when seen along the surface of the earth. Lines of old earthworks, foundations of long removed columns, groups of burial mounds suddenly become visible from an aëroplane, as though by the same magic as that which to the eyes of their builders would have held up the aviators. Such a long background of human life on the earth, however little we may know about its details or its personalities, changes very perceptibly the perspective of that short period about which we know something more.

It is the same with our recent realization that history must utilize what it can of psychology and economics and biology. History is not merely an account of external events, but an explanation of them; and for this it recognizes its need of a broader outlook than its immediate records can give it. Earlier in this paper I

may have seemed to speak with some slight disparagement of Professor Robinson's moderate estimate in one of his books of the claim of history to be considered a science. If so I would like to redress the balance by acknowledging my indebtedness and that of all who have read "The New History" to his suggestive ideas of the proper breadth and content of history.

More important, from the scientific point of view, than the extension of the field of history, is the growth of rigorous standards of historical research and reasoning. It is conceivable that the mass of historical material we now possess should be exploited merely for purposes of supporting preconceived beliefs or strengthening one form or another of propaganda. But contemporaneously with the increase of known historical facts has grown up a critical attitude toward them that is now of overwhelming influence. Exhaustive search for materials, weighing of testimony, objectivity of treatment, caution of statement, have become almost universal. The attitude of the historical investigator, writer or teacher as he uses his manuscript or printed records or material remains is not markedly different from the attitude of the chemist with his test tube, the astronomer with his telescope or the zoologist studying his living or sectioned and stained material. The scientific spirit of the age, the criticism of his teachers, or perhaps a wholesome fear of what the reviewers may say about his book in the American Historical Review or similar journals, have made the student of history on the whole as careful as any other scientist. Of course his materials are different, difficult, elusive, sometimes almost too tenuous to be seen,

too imponderable to be weighed, incapable of being repeated; but his spirit is the same as that of the student of more concrete materials, and it is that spirit which makes him a scientist and history a science.

Along with these advances, perhaps as a result of them, have been introduced into historical work some high moral qualities; tolerance, sympathy, patience, insight. In the eyes of Blok, the latest historian of the Netherlands, Philip II is not nearly as much of a monster as in those of Motley. He has some tolerance for his policy, antipathetic to him as it may be. Trevelyan, the English historian, and Van Tyne, the American, in writing their histories of the American Revolution have each been so willing to recognize the point of view of the other side that they have even created scandal in their respective countries among those who have not yet grown up to the tolerant attitude of the modern historian.

Sympathetic interest extends to wider social circles. The historian is no longer interested only in the great ones of the earth. Four generations ago Madox, author of a book of old-fashioned learning, "The History of the Exchequer," apologized for his work on the ground that "its Subject is Low," a statement made all the more impressive by his spelling of "Low" with a capital. But we are no longer ashamed to write on financial history, or on the history of commerce or of agriculture or sanitation or domestic life, nor to occupy ourselves with the interests of the people, however plain. History is, therefore, no longer a narrative of the doings of kings and statesmen and prelates and generals; it considers merchants and artisans, farmers and explorers,

students and vagabonds. Its interests have thus become more inclusive, it takes into consideration more factors and its generalizations are to that extent more likely to be correct.

In enumerating the new materials, implements and ideals of historical research and writing I have spoken as if history had already become in the full sense of the word a science. This is, of course, not the fact. Many works of history appear that are far from scientific in their choice of materials and in their use of them. But they are not usually by the masters in the historical guild. They are rather the writings of men of literary interests and training who have deviated into the field of history, like Sandburg's admirable but by no means critically written "Prairie Years" of Lincoln, or Wells' valuable but largely subjective "Outline of History." Or they are written by men whose minds are so dominated by national or partisan or religious or personal considerations that all their thinking runs in narrow channels, of which the historical channel is only one. Or they are merely compilations.

Yet even the most dispassionate and highly trained of historians has much to learn before he can handle his recalcitrant materials in as purely scientific a spirit as does the astronomer, the geologist or the zoologist. The scientific historian must learn, in the first place, to write without partisanship or special pleading,—no easy task, considering his private predilections. The historian born and bred a Protestant must be able to write a history of the Reformation that will satisfy fair-minded Catholics,—and *vice versa*. A history of the American Civil War must not indicate by its tone or

contents or conclusions whether it comes from above or below Mason and Dixon's line. An English historian must be able to write a fair history of Ireland, a Frenchman of Germany, an Italian of Austria, an American of all of them,—and *vice versa.*

It has been more than 2000 years since Polybius taught us that the function of the historian is "to record with fidelity what was actually said or done, no matter how commonplace it may be." It has been a century and a half since Gibbon declared it to be the duty of history to set forth "the truth, naked unblushing truth." It has been almost a hundred years since Ranke said the past should be described "*wie es eigentlich gewesen ist,*" "as it really was." Our own American historian Henry C. Lea, in his presidential address to the American Historical Association defined history as "A serious attempt to ascertain the severest truth as to the past and to set it forth without fear or favor." We have been slow to learn our lesson. Yet every modern historian will acknowledge that it is his first duty to tell the truth. History, if it is to be a science, must not be so written as to teach any particular national, party, religious or economic doctrine. This is the first and greatest of all the historical commandments.

There are other requirements. The military element must be conceded less attention in describing the past than it has been in history's pre-scientific days. The vogue of warfare as a subject of history has rested on three grounds; the materials for it have been abundant and easy to use, it appeals to a group of active, though somewhat superficial interests of readers, and it has been bound up with picturesque crises in the lives

of nations. But none of these measures the actual importance of its influence on the course of events, which is the problem that history has to solve. The greatest changes in the life of mankind have occurred in times of peace not of war. It is the duty of the historian to seek out these obscure factors, not to be satisfied with those which are superficial, or easy to write of, or flattering to national vanity. Less preference of writers for the history of military events and diminished popularity of the same type of history among readers have long been noticeable. "Drum and trumpet history" is out of fashion and the old disproportionate attention to the history of war persists only in the text-books, where the young people are often given what the school authorities think they should have rather than either what they would prefer or what the better historians would give them.

Except in some such indirect way as I shall refer to later, history must not be used to teach patriotism. Any indirect object of desire in writing or teaching is destructive to the testing of materials, interpretation of events and understanding of personalities that are essential to the scientific treatment of history. History with a purpose is worse than a novel with a purpose. Teleology in historical study and writing is indefensible. The belief that God has a plan for the progress of a nation or of the world, and that this plan can be discovered by any one historian and used for the explanation of events belongs in the field of religion, not of history. For centuries, from Orosius' *Seven Books of History Directed against the Pagans* to the proposal of a certain modern publicist that his-

torians should find the plan by which God has disclosed himself to man, then follow that plan in all public teaching, history has been used as the handmaid of one or another religious body; but none of this has been scientific history. History can describe the occurrences in the life of man; it is no part of its work to explain the purposes of God. For any historian to write as if he knew the plans of an all-knowing God is as unscientific as it is impious.

Any such notion as the "manifest destiny" of a nation is mere mysticism. Expressions one meets with not infrequently, that such an occurrence took place "in order that parliament might take its permanent form," or "in order that France should attain unity" are not based upon a scientific conception of history. A nation's destiny is the result of all the influences to which it has been and is being subjected, and is worked out as it goes along, not discoverable beforehand. New influences may give a new direction to a nation's life at any time.

We need to be wary of attributing too much influence to individual men, no matter how great. The same tendency in human nature, perhaps a subconscious survival from an early tribal state, that makes men ready to follow a leader, tempts the historian to exaggerate the leader's influence. Carlyle said "History is the history of great men," but this was true only of Carlyle's way of writing history. It has no scientific support. We all know that in our own time the influence of even the greatest man is dependent on the existence of favoring circumstances. Mussolini is only powerful because he works in harmony with the interests and aspirations

of a vast number of Italians—how many—whether a majority or a minority—whether for a few years or for a longer time, whether "evviva la liberta" or "evviva il duce" represents real Italy, who knows? But we know that holding or expressing different opinions from the Fascisti he would be powerless and insignificant. So it was with Napoleon, the military and political genius who embodied the national spirit of France emancipated by the Revolution. Fifty years earlier Napoleon would in all probability have remained a subordinate army officer, kept in relative obscurity by his plebeian origin and the fact that he served an autocratic king and was limited by the restrictions of a long established military, political and social order. If he had lived fifty years later he would have been restricted by still another set of influences. Queen Elizabeth was one of the most individualized of sovereigns in the view of her contemporaries and of later ages, yet no historian will contend that she made Elizabethan England; she was merely the most conspicuous part of it. Individuals of great natural gifts or occupying high place often give force and unity to the desires and capacities of large groups of their contemporaries, but they have not given these desires or capacities to their contemporaries, nor have they influenced appreciably the "social heritage" of their time. Their leadership has been interesting, and even important, their actually creative influence has been negligible. It is the difficult but unescapable duty of the scientific historian to discriminate between the influence of individual men and the irresistible tendencies of their time.

The untrained observer of the past is like a man

sitting by a mountain stream watching the chips made by the woodcutters floating by. The white chips seem to follow a self-chosen course in the stream, avoiding rocks, following swift currents and seeking quiet backwaters under the banks. They seem sometimes to follow certain leaders: a larger block comes whirling along, and in its wake follow smaller pieces as if they were dependent on its guidance or anxious to press into its train. But this is all seeming. The smaller do not really seek the larger nor do any of them, large or small, choose their own way. They are all alike swept along by currents over which they have no control and follow a course that is governed by forces beyond themselves. It is true that the analogy is not complete. The stream of human affairs is not a different stream, but is itself made up of human thoughts and actions; but none the less any individual man is almost as powerless to control its great currents as the drifting pieces of wood; and this is as true of the king, the general or the statesman as it is of the common man.

Lastly, scientific history must be wary of the use of literary devices. The historian's responsibility is primarily to the actors in his drama not to the watchers of his play. He must keep in mind the facts he is dealing with, not be too much concerned with his method of presentation of them. If historical narrative or description is to be scientific and at the same time vivid, appealing, it must be so because of its own content and of the understanding of it by the historian, not by any deliberate planning on his part to make it interesting, eloquent or persuasive. The fire and the heat and "the light that never was on land or sea" that warm

and lure on the artist or the poet or the literary creator make too seductive a world for the cool careful observer of the past to trust himself in.

And yet it certainly need not be that history should be dull or uninteresting. The life of man in the past is interesting in itself; it cannot be that it is dependent for its interest on any false pictures or romantic or sentimental light thrown upon it. The sharp clear lines of the novels of Thomas Hardy and Jane Austen or the portraits of Holbein and the guardsmen of Meissonier and the etchings of Pennell appeal to men as well as more romantic story and more exuberant art. May the historian not count on a similar response to his plain, unvarnished tale of real life? If history with all its newly acquired materials, with its firmer methods, with its freedom from the disturbing duty of teaching religion, morals, patriotism,—with its exemption from hero-worship, should simply tell the truth, the truth may not only be, according to the old proverb, "stranger than fiction," but more interesting. The phenomena with which the scientific historian deals are not mere chemical affinities and physical laws and astronomical measurements and niceties of biological adjustment and evolution. If those have been made fascinating to other than their professed students, how much more should the experience of our kind, the life of man, with all its ideals and achievements, its tragedy and comedy and pathos, its personalities and races and customs and movements, serve as the material for a story that may thrill and charm its readers?

When I protested against the preoccupation of historians with the literary side of their work I did not

deprecate the production of good literature. But this should be their secondary not their primary aim. Their first interest should and must be the truth of their narrative. Yet if the heart is right the trained hand may be trusted to write with skill and acceptance. The main question is that of motive, of intention. This must be to treat the phenomena of history as any other scientific student treats the material of his specialty. Only, as far as interest goes, the historian is fortunate in his subject. "The proper study of mankind is man."

May I use one or two quotations to show what I mean by eloquence at the cost of truth, and eloquence coming incidentally, so to speak. Macaulay in one of his historical essays, in order to bring out a contrast between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, describes the Reformation as an occasion where a "great society has risen up like one man, and emancipated itself by one mighty effort from the superstition of ages." "This spectacle," he says, "was common in the sixteenth century." What nation rose "as one man" in the 16th century to carry out the Reformation? Certainly not England with its deep and permanent division among Puritans, Anglicans and Catholics; not France with its Huguenot wars and uncertain outcome; not the Netherlands with its banishments and compromises; not Germany as a whole or any state of Germany. No historian would make such a statement if he were primarily interested in giving a truthful account, not in pointing a contrast. On the other hand another historian, the great-nephew of Macaulay, as it happens, George Macaulay Trevelyan, in a book published within the last few months, a mere text-book of English his-

tory, in describing the settlement of the new races in England sums it up as follows: "The era of Celt, Saxon and Dane is like Macbeth's battle on the blasted heath. Prophecy hovers around. Horns are heard blowing in the mist, and a confused uproar of savage tumult and outrage. We catch glimpses of giant figures—mostly warriors at strife. But there are ploughmen too, it seems, breaking the primeval clod, and we hear the sound of forests crashing to the axe. Around all is the lap of waves and the cry of seamen beaching their ships." No one hundred words could give a more just picture of those three misty centuries, and seldom have a hundred words of historical writing given more aesthetic pleasure to at least one reader.

It is the same with patriotism as with literary excellence; it may come by an indirect route. We love what we know. The region we have been brought up in looks the best to us. We stand by our family not because of the perfections of its members but in spite of their imperfections. A truthful narrative of the history of our country may be highly conducive to patriotism, even if it has to show that we were not always right in our wars and that our ancestors were men of like passions and imperfections with ourselves. It is probably as bad psychology as it is bad history to represent the early years of the nation as better than the later. A sense of the reality of the past may awaken patriotism where an unreal story of visionary perfection may leave it slumbering. Although history should not undertake to teach morals, right and wrong may assert themselves in the most dispassionate statement of historical occurrences. Mr. Lea says of history, "It

may and generally will convey a moral—but that moral should educe itself from the facts. . . . Righteous indignation should be a luxury left by the historian to his reader." Therefore to assert that history should follow a scientific method is not to assert that it should not be interesting or patriotic or moral. May it not be that from a simple devotion to the ennobling task of writing true history will emerge a new eloquence and a greater persuasiveness to love of country and of goodness? "Seek ye first the kingdom . . . and all these things shall be added unto you."

And yet a generation, perhaps many generations, may have to pass before, in the pageant I described in the opening of this paper, history may be expected to appear as one of the sciences, as young, as alert, clothed in as modern habiliments, as assertive, as active in a career of usefulness as any of them. When that time comes what usefulness can be expected from history, apart from the general cultural effect of all historical study? I am not prepared to give an adequate answer. As has been somewhat bitterly said of Christianity, it has never been tried, and we have therefore no means of knowing.

I have not much confidence that definite individual historical examples will ever be very useful for present-day decisions. No matter how full our knowledge of the examples, no matter how impartially they are interpreted, there will always be the lack of exact analogy. History never repeats itself exactly, it repeats itself only in a very general way; some of its factors are the same, others different. It is not likely that general agreement will often be reached as to what lesson is

taught or what action is indicated as wise or unwise by some definite experience in the past distantly analogous to some problem of the present. "All history teaches" will probably continue to be a formula of the propagandist or the sciolist, not of the scientific historian, the statesman or the common man in his day-by-day problems.

I have rather more hope, as I have tried to demonstrate in another connection, of the discovery of prevailing tendencies or "laws" in human affairs that may suggest the normal course of events. If we know what has been some trend of the past, we may perhaps be able to conform ourselves to that tendency in the present, and thus act more wisely. If trade-unions, for instance, are always with us it is waste of effort for employers to carry on a nation-wide campaign for the open shop. If democracy is permanent it is unfortunate for Italy and Spain and Greece and Hungary to seek their salvation in opposition to it. If the alumni of American colleges are steadily taking more responsibility and providing more support for the colleges, it would be well for the administrators to acknowledge the fact. If prohibition is merely one of the familiar type of limitations on individualism, like compulsory keeping to the right on the road, that have proved conducive to a higher individual liberty, it is a pity to be fighting it. Yet the discovery and general acceptance of historical laws must at best be slow work and may prove as unattainable as securing specific historical examples capable of practical application.

We shall probably have to satisfy ourselves at first with more indirect forms of usefulness. The greatest

practical triumphs of other sciences have been by-products. But results are no less useful because they are indirect. If history can determine what persons or causes were responsible for the late war it will lay a restless ghost. If it can help to discover the causes of all wars it may be a principal instrument in the greatest step forward in human happiness. Chemistry may enable us to fight wars more destructively and, for war purposes, more effectively. History may just possibly help us to secure the abolition of war, and leave chemistry to more peaceful pursuits.

History may help solve the labor problem. Employers and employees continue to fight their battles as if similar battles had never been fought in the past and as if experience had no value. Politicians and economists have no solution to offer, the animadversions of judges and lawyers are quite sterile, the appeals of humanitarians fall on deaf ears. It is just possible the historians will one time be asked whether they have a message, and their message when given be listened to.

Historians may do their best work through other men. If they write in a scientific spirit, with the degree of thoroughness, fairness, toleration and insight incumbent upon them, readers of their histories may be powerfully influenced in the direction of those virtues. Is it presumptuous for a historian to claim that a great service would be performed if scientific history could extend its special standards, critical tests of its sources of information, caution in their interpretation and moderation in their statement, to lawyers, clergymen, journalists and public speakers, who have more direct access to the community in its everyday life than have

the historians? Lately we have heard of a distant nation thrown into surprised excitement and antagonism to ours, and our own roused to causeless hostility, by a careless and apparently quite unfounded statement by an American clergyman that there are 100,000 Christian women now held in durance in Turkish harems. An incredible public statement that women are now reading the mass in Catholic churches in Mexico has served to complicate the question of our relations with that country. The charges of corruption that have split and confused local politics in a western State are now acknowledged by the man who made them, to have been based on "Pullman car gossip." How long has some beneficial influence of the West on Russia been postponed by the persistent misrepresentations of that country in the newspaper press? No thoughtful reader of the newspapers, listener to sermons or after-dinner speeches or public addresses, or observer of political discussions can fail to deplore the general carelessness in accepting facts and recklessness in making statements. No modern historical work would or could be published on such a basis. Why cannot our standards be a leaven to leaven the lump? Why cannot public discussion become as scientific at least as history?

This may be the historian's greatest usefulness. The scientific spirit is always good, whether the bearer of its message is one or another of the sciences, but history, just because it deals with human affairs, may carry the message further than any other branch of intellectual interest. History has been prevented from exerting its proper influence in this direction by its

servitude to national pride, party spirit and military tradition, by its hero worshp, by its effort to give moral teachings and its preoccupation with literary devices. When these practices have been abandoned or reduced to conformity with the scientific ideal, history may do more than any other science to emancipate and liberalize and discipline the human spirit.

This is in itself a practical result but it may lead to more of practical usefulness. If human action in the past can be looked upon as part of a reasonably well understood world, if it can be conceived of, along with the motion of the stars, chemical and physical forces, the life of animals and plants, economic and psychological phenomena, as all parts of a *cosmos* or organized or organizable universe, we will know where we stand, and will be able to decide what we can and cannot do with our human world.

For after all, in the last analysis, the greatest usefulness of history must be its capacity to explain the present,—the world in which we now dwell. Things as they are are too momentary in their continuance, too detached from one another, too varied, too incommensurable, to be reduced to any comprehensibility by direct observation. We are forced to inquire how they came to be as they are. If we are to have any clear understanding of present political, economic and social conditions, if we are to judge whether these conditions are on the whole beneficial or injurious, and, if the latter, whether they are remediable or inevitable, practically the only method of approach offering any hope of solution is the historical approach. If this historical

method is enlightened, scientific, we may hope to understand our time. History will be the schoolmaster of understanding. This will be its great triumph. It was the wisest of all men who adjured us "Get wisdom, and with all thy getting get understanding."

A NOTE ON THE TYPE IN WHICH THIS BOOK IS SET

This book is composed (on the Linotype), in Scotch. There is a divergence of opinion regarding the exact origin of this face, some authorities holding that it was first cut by Alexander Wilson & Son, of Glasgow, in 1837; others trace it back to a modernized Caslon old style brought out by Mrs. Henry Caslon in 1796 to meet the demand for modern faces brought about by the popularity of the Bodoni types. Whatever its origin, it is certain that the face was widely used in Scotland, where it was called Modern Roman, and since its introduction into America it has been known as Scotch. The essential characteristics of the Scotch face are its sturdy capitals, its full rounded lower case, the graceful fillet of its serifs and the general effect of crispness.

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